Campbell Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 2 Spring 1997
January 1997

An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice
Antonin Scalia
Autumn Fox
Stephen R. McAllister

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Autumn Fox and Stephen R. McAllister, An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 Campbell L. Rev. 223
(1997).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.

Article 2

Fox and McAllister: An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia

ARTICLES

AN EAGLE SOARING: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA
AuTuMN Fox*
STEPHEN R. MCALLISTER**
INTRODUCTION

"[T say that JusticeAntonin Scalia is a conservative is to say that
an eagle is just a bird. For Scalia is not just a conservative, he is a
magnificent conservative, often soaringalone above his friends and
foes with a power and a style that are his alone."'

Antonin Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court of the
United States by President Ronald Reagan in 1986.2 Appointed to
take Justice William Rehnquist's seat after he was selected as
Chief Justice, Scalia was described at the time as the "intellectual
lodestar who would pull the Court to the right by the force of his
brilliance." 3 Ten years later, however, not only is Scalia criticized
for failing to build a conservative consensus, he is increasingly
criticized for his caustic attacks on his colleagues and for the high
moral tone of his opinions.4 Some critics say that "it is hard to
* Law clerk to The Honorable Jerry G. Elliott, Kansas Court of Appeals.
J.D., University of Kansas, 1997.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. Former Law Clerk to
The Honorable Byron R. White and The Honorable Clarence Thomas, Supreme
Court of the United States.
1. A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF THE SUPREME COURT 5 (Rodney A. Smolla ed.,
1995.)
2. Id. at xii
3. DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION
OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA xii (1996) (citing Tony Mauro, High Court Adjourns
for the Summer Intact, LEGAL TIMES, at 10 (July 9, 1990)).
4. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Scalia and His Scorchers: High Court Justice
Vehemently Upholds Values in His Opinions, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 4, 1996,
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recognize the bright witty Chicago law professor who ascended to
the Court ten years ago [his] charm has given way to bombast and
"
petulance. 5
In spite of this criticism, Scalia has been the focus of a maelstrom of scholarly attention.6 Love him or hate him, Antonin
at 19; David M. O'Brien, Scalia's Increasing Incivility Debases the Supreme
Court, His Arguments are More About Sarcastic Dissent Than Reasonable
Debate, STAR TRIBUNE, July 22, 1996, at 9A; David M. Savage, Scalia Virtually
Alienated From Supreme Court Circle; He's the Last Voice of Conservatism
Among Justices Who Vote Differently, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 28,
1996, at A29.
5. David S. Savage, Scalia Virtually Alienated From Supreme Court Circle;
He's the Last Voice of ConservatismAmong Justices Who Vote Differently, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 28, 1996, at A29.
6. See e.g., 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1991. This edition, with the exception of two
articles, is devoted entirely to articles about Justice Scalia. There are a total of
15 articles about Scalia in this issue alone. At the time that it was published,
Scalia had been on the Court for only five years. On Scalia's Rule of Law Theory
see also George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99
YALE L. J. 1297 (1990); Ernest P. Fronzuto, An Endorsement of the Test for
General Applicability: Smith II, Justice Scalia and the Free Exercise of Religion,
6 SETON HALL CONsT. L. J. 713 (1996); Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical
Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEo. Wash. L. Rev. 991 (1994); Benjamin
Young Jr., Justice Scalia's History and Tradition: The Chief Nightmare in
Professor Tribe'sAnxiety Closet, 78 VA. L. REV. 581 (1992); Renee Skinner, Note,
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,46 Baylor L. Rev. 259
(1994). On Scalia's Separation of Powers Theory see also Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most DangerousBranch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725 (1996); Keith Werhan, Normalizing
the Separationof Powers, 70 TuL. L. REv. 2681 (1996); Joanne C. Brant, Taking
the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of
Powers, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 5 (1995); Christopher E. Smith JusticeAntonin Scalia
and the Institutions of American Government, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783
(1990); Price Marshall, "No PoliticalTruth:"The Federalistand Justice Scalia on
the Separationof Powers, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 245 (1989/1990). On
Scalia's Statutory Interpretation Theory see also Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion
and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93 (1995); Jane S. Schacter,
Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 593 (1995); John Polich, The Ambiguity of
Plain Meaning: Smith v. United States and the New Textualism, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 259 (1994); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 'Plain Meaning:" Justice Scalia's
Jurisprudenceof Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. L. J. & Pus. POL'Y 401
(1994); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN L. REv. 383 (1992); Phillip P.
Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1992); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative
History and Interpretation of Statutes: Towards a Fact Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990); William N. Eskridge, The
New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621 (1990). This list of articles is not
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Scalia demands attention.7 He demands attention through his
opinions, through his sense of wit, and through his jurisprudence.
It may be, therefore, that Scalia's failure to build a consensus on
the Court will, in the end, matter very little. Instead, it is his
intellect, his legal principles, and his writing ability that will be
his legacy to the Court.
This legacy, comprised of clear logic, concise writing, and the
advocacy of clear legal rules, can be very seductive. It is difficult
to argue, for example, that clear rules are not preferable to
unclear ones. Or, that when the Constitution explicitly states that
certain powers "shall be vested" in the President, those powers
rightfully belong to the President and the President alone. Or,
that a word says what it means and means what it says. As
seductive as these arguments are, however, they still should be
examined with a critical eye.
One way to do this is to review Justice Scalia's opinions and
consider the Justice's explication of his preferred legal principles.
This article examines three of Justice Scalia's preferred legal principles as explained by the Justice himself in his opinions and other
rulings. Section I addresses Scalia's call for a Rule of Law as a
law of rules. Section II reviews Scalia's separation-of-powers
jurisprudence. Section III discusses Scalia's theory of statutory
interpretation. Finally, Section IV considers two of Scalia's more
vocal critics.
Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is indeed seductive, both in its
simplicity and in its clarity. Additionally, Justice Scalia generally
applies his principles consistently and honestly. While many may
disagree with the outcome of Scalia's opinions, or with his choice
of legal principles, one is left with the question, often posed by
Scalia himself, if not these legal principles then what principles?
The primary challenge for Scalia's critics is to answer this quesexhaustive. There are many other articles, too numerous to list, about Justice
Scalia and his jurisprudence.
7. While Justice Scalia frequently authors dissents, it is in his concurrences
that he perhaps most often asserts his jurisprudential viewpoint. In 1986 he
wrote seventeen concurring opinions, the Court average was eight. In 1987, he
wrote sixteen concurring opinions, the Court average was ten. In 1988, he wrote
twenty-four concurring opinions, fully double that of the average of twelve. In
1990, he wrote eighteen to the Court's average of five. In 1989, he wrote fifteen
concurring opinions and fourteen dissenting opinions, far exceeding the Court
average of eight and ten respectively. While he may not always "win," he is more
often than not "heard." See Schultz & Smith, supra note 3, at 109.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
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tion and, secondarily, to demonstrate that they can and will apply
their chosen legal principles in a consistent and honest manner.
I.

"A BAD RULE is BETTER THAN NO RULE AT ALL""

"Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after repeatedly being killed
and buried,Lemon stalks our EstablishmentClausejurisprudence
once again,frightening little children and school attorneys .... "9
In his 1989 essay "The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,"' ° Justice Scalia advocates a Rule of Law rather than a discretionary
approach to the law." By "discretion," Scalia is referring to the
use of "balancing" or "totality of the circumstances" tests to decide
cases.' 2 According to Scalia, when the Court decides cases by "balancing" competing interests, it is not the Court that will be deciding the law, but thirteen different courts of appeals and fifty state
supreme courts. 13 Scalia believes that this approach to deciding
a "needful
the law leads to a lack of predictability and certainty,
4
name."'
the
of
worthy
law
any
of
characteristic
Further, Scalia believes that it is only through the use of
clear, generally applicable rules that judges hedge themselves in,
thereby decreasing the risk that they will decide cases based on
their own biases, beliefs, or sympathies rather than on objective
legal principles. 15 Additionally, Scalia asserts that while a firm
rule can inhibit courts, it can also embolden them. Scalia states
that "[t]he chances that frail men and women will stand up to
their unpleasant duty is greatly increased if they can stand
behind the solid shield of a firm, clear principle." 16 Scalia concludes that the establishment of such rules is an essential component of the judicial process.' 7 He admits, nonetheless, that
balancing tests will be with the Court forever and states that "for
my sins, I will probably write some of the opinions that use them.
8. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.

CH.

L.

REV.

1175, 1179 (1989).
9. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Scalia, supra note 8, at 1175.

11. See id.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 1179.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1180.
Id.

17. Id. at 1185.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/2
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All I urge is that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as
far as the nature of the question allows." 8
A.

Employment Division v. Smith

In Employment Division v. Smith 9 Respondents were Native
Americans who were fired from their jobs with a private drug
rehabilitation organization for their ceremonial use of peyote.2 °
When Respondents applied for unemployment compensation,
Petitioner denied their request, stating that they were ineligible
for benefits because they were fired for work-related misconduct. 2 '
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner's
denial of benefits violated Respondents' right to the free exercise
of religion under the First Amendment.2 2
On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, Petitioner argued
that the denial was permissible because consumption of peyote
was a crime under Oregon law.23 That court determined that the
purpose of denying benefits due to misconduct-to preserve the
financial integrity of the unemployment fund-was inadequate to
justify infringing Respondents' First Amendment rights.2 4
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment and remanded to the Oregon Supreme Court for determination of whether the sacramental use of peyote was a "crime," and
thus prohibited by Oregon law.2 5 The Oregon Supreme Court
found that the ceremonial use of peyote was a crime, but reaffirmed its ruling and held that prohibiting the ceremonial use of
peyote was invalid under the First Amendment.26 The United
States Supreme Court once again granted certiorari.2 7
In a victory for the Rule of Law, Justice Scalia authored a
majority opinion extending the Rule of Law to the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, an area historically fraught with bal18. Id. at 1187.
19. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

20. Id. at 874.
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Id. at 875.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See id.
Id. at 875-76.
Employment Division v. Smith, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988).
Employment Division v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
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ancing tests and "flexibility."28 Although it appeared that Scalia's
victory might be short lived,29 it was a victory nonetheless.
1. The FirstAmendment and Conduct Prohibitedby Law
Scalia began his analysis by rejecting Respondents' argument
that the Court was bound by its precedent in Sherbert v. Verner3 °
and Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana.31 In both of those cases
the Court held that a state could not condition the receipt of
unemployment benefits on an individual's willingness to forgo conduct required by his or her religion. 2 Scalia reiterated that in
Smith I, the Court held that if Oregon law prohibited the use of
peyote, and if that prohibition was consistent with the Constitution, then Respondents had no right to violate that law.3 3 This
being true, Sherbert and Thomas offered no protection to the
Respondents.34 Recognizing a "Rule of Law" opportunity when he
saw one, Scalia went on to consider whether Oregon's prohibition
of the use of peyote was permissible under the First
Amendment. 5
Scalia recognized that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment protects the free exercise of religion, but stated that
the free exercise of religion means "first and foremost, the right to
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires."36
Therefore, any governmental regulation of beliefs as such, would
be unconstitutional. 7 In the case before him, Scalia argued,
Respondents sought to extend this plain meaning of "prohibiting
free exercise," 38 to "include requiring any individual to observe a

generally applicable law which forbids them from performing an
28. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
29. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was passed on November
16, 1993 as a direct response to the holding in Smith II. This past term, the
Court granted certiorari in a case which upheld the constitutionality of RFRA,
see Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 293
(1996) (argued Feb. 19, 1997) and on June 25, 1997, the Court in a 6-3 decision
declared RFRA unconstitutional. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. -, 65
U.S.L.W. 4612, 1997 WL 345322 (1997).
30. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
32. Id.
33. Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 876.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 878.
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act that their religious beliefs require." 39 Scalia rejected this
argument both as a misreading of the text and as a matter of
precedent.4 °
Quoting Reynolds v. United States41 and Minnersville School
District Board of Education v. Gobitis as support,4 2 Scalia stated
that:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law that is not aimed at the promotion or restriction of
religious beliefs. Laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinion, they may with practices. Can a man excuse his practices

to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious beliefs superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to
43
become a law unto himself.
Scalia was not alone then, in his application of a generally
applicable law analysis. He had the company of Justice Felix
Frankfurter and precedent for support.
Citing United States v. Lee 44 as further support, Scalia reiterated that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
from the obligation to comply with a generally applicable law on
the grounds that the law prohibits religious conduct. 45 Additionally, Scalia stated that the only decisions where the Court has
held that the First Amendment bars the application of generally
applicable laws in this context have involved the Free Exercise
Clause plus other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech.46
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
42. 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.).
43. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67. For a more complete discussion of Scalia's
use of Gobitis andReynolds as precedent for his holding in Smith II see Ernest P.
Fronzuto, An Endorsementfor the Test of GeneralApplicability: Smith II Justice
Scalia, and the Conflict Between Neutral Laws and the Free Exercise of Religion,
6 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 713 (1996).
44. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
45. Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J. concurring)). In Lee, the Court held that an
Amish employer was not exempt from the payment of social security taxes simply
because the Amish faith prohibited participation in governmental support
programs.
46. Id. at 881.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
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Strict Scrutiny and the Political Process

Finding no such "hybrid" violation in Smith II, Scalia goes on
to reject Respondents' argument that claims for religious exemption from generally applicable laws must be evaluated under the
Sherbert "compelling interest" balancing test.4 7 Scalia stated that
while this test has been used to analyze free exercise challenges to
generally applicable laws, it has never been used to invalidate
one.4" Neither was Scalia willing to apply the test only when the
conduct prohibited is "central" to the individual's religion.4 9
Scalia asserted that "[ilt is no more appropriate for judges to
determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs ...than it would be
for them to determine the 'importance' of ideas . . . in the free
speech field." 50 Scalia stated that what this test "produces in
those other fields -equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow
of contending speech-are constitutional norms; what it would
produce here-a private right to ignore generally applicable laws
-is a constitutional anomaly."5 Scalia held, therefore, that
it is enforceable
where a law is neutral and generally applicable,
52
and will not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
In conclusion, Scalia extended the Rule of Law when he said:
47. Id. at 882-83.
48. Id. at 884-85.
49. See id. at 886.
50. Id. at 886-87.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 885. At least one legal scholar agrees with Scalia's holding in
Smith. See Fronzuto, supra note 43, at 760. He states that:
The historic support for the test of general applicability is compelling.
Beginning with acceptance of a rationalistic interpretation of religion by
Thomas Jefferson early in American history, and the Supreme Court's
affirmation of this standard with decisions such as Reynolds and Smith
II, the constitutional principle promulgated is that individuals may not
be exempt from the civil consequences of their actions simply because
these acts are engaged in for religious purposes ....
Commenting on the passage of RFRA, Fronzuto also asserts that it is not the
duty of Congress to impose upon the Court a standard of free exercise review that
the Court has specifically rejected. He states that:
By allowing the legislature to provide religious accommodation, and not
the courts, the test of general applicability is a classic exercise of judicial
restraint .... It is not for a biased ... judge to determine . . .what
religious beliefs are constitutionally significant enough to be exempt
from the law. Under the test of general applicability, all religious actors
are treated fairly, providing little room for judicial abuse.
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It may be fairly said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in, but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itselfor in which judges
weight the social importanceof all laws against the centrality of all
religious belief ...

.

Smith II was Scalia's greatest victory in extending the Rule of
54
Law in the constitutional arena.
B.

Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc.

In Barnes v. Glen Theater,Inc. ,5 Respondents were the Kitty
Kat Lounge, Inc., the Glen Theater, Inc., and individual dancers
who wished to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment.5 6
The state of Indiana's indecency law required that the dancers
wear "pasties" and a "G-string."5 7 Totally nude dancing was,
therefore, illegal. Respondents brought suit in district court
claiming that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
expression prevented Indiana from enforcing the law. 58
The district court granted Respondents' request for injunctive
relief, holding that the statute was over broad. 59 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court, allowing respondents to pursue their First Amendment
claim as it related to their dancing.6 0 On remand, the district
court concluded that totally nude dancing was not expressive
activity as defined and protected by the Constitution of United
States.6 1 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
53. Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 890 (emphasis added).
54. See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993). In this case, decided three years after Smith, the Court again
applied the test of general applicability to a First Amendment Free Exercise
challenge. Many commentators hoped that the Court would take this
opportunity to reverse or limit its holding in Smith H. Contrary to these hopes,
the Court, in a unanimous decision, did not retreat from Smith II at all. For
further discussion of the Court's decision in this case see Renee Skinner, Note,
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free
Exercise, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 259 (1994).
55. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
56. Id. at 562-63.
57. See IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
58. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 564.
61. Id. at 564-65.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
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court and held that totally nude dancing was expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment. 62 The Seventh Circuit then
heard the case en banc. 63 The en banc court held that non-obscene
nude dancing performed for entertainment was expression protected by the First Amendment. 64 Further, the court held that
Indiana's indecency statute improperly infringed Respondents'
right of expression because its purpose was to prevent the
message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the dancers.6 5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, applying the four part
indecency statute did not vioO'Brien66 test, held that Indiana's
67
Amendment.
late the First
1.

On Nudity, the Hoosier Dome, and Generally Applicable
Laws

While he agreed with the judgment of the Court in Barnes,
Justice Scalia wrote separately. 68 He wrote to extend the Rule of
Law. Decided one year after Employment Division v. Smith, this
case presented Scalia with an opportunity to reiterate his Rule of
Law analysis in the First Amendment context, this time with
respect to speech instead of religion. He agreed that Indiana's
indecency law should be upheld, not because it survived some
"lower level" of First Amendment scrutiny, but because it was a
generally applicable law not specifically directed at expression,
and therefore not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. 9

62. Id.
63. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
64. Id.

65. Id.
66. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) The Court set forth a fourpart test to determine whether a statute impermissibly infringes on the First
Amendment, and specifically, whether it infringes symbolic speech. The test is
whether (1) The statute is within the constitutional power of the government; (2)
Whether it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
Whether the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free

expression and (4) Whether the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. Id. at 376-77.
67. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565.
68. Id. at 572. (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/2
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2. The Text, the Text, the Text
Scalia began his analysis, as he did in Employment Division v.
Smith ,7 by looking at the text of the statute. The text of the statute provided:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity;
(4) fondles genitals of himself or another person; commits public
indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque
covering of any part of the nipple .... 71
Scalia stated that on its face, the law was not directed at
expression in particular. 72 Quoting Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, Scalia agreed that "Indiana does not regulate dancing.73 It regulates public nudity .... Almost the entire domain of
Indiana's statute is unrelated to expression, unless we view nude
beaches and topless hot dog vendors as speech." 74 Scalia rejected
the Respondents' assertion that the statute could not be characterized as a generally applicable law because it impinged their
right to convey a "message of eroticism." 75 Scalia, looking again to
the text, stated that the intent to convey such a message is not a
necessary element of the offense, "nor would one commit the
offense by conveying the most explicit message of eroticism, so
long as he does not commit any of the four specified acts in the
process."

76

3. History & Tradition
Next, Scalia looked at the "history and tradition" of the statute to support his Rule of Law analysis. He pointed out that Indiana's first indecency law, promulgated in 1831, predated totally
70. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
71. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
72. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572.
73. Id. at 572-73 (quoting Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081,
1120 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
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nude dancing.7" Additionally, Scalia stated that if "Indiana in
practice targeted only expressive nudity, while turning a blind eye
to nude beaches and unclothed purveyors of hot dogs and machine
tools, it might be said that what posed as a regulation of conduct
in general was in reality a regulation of only communicative conduct." 8 Because Respondents could offer no proof of such targeting, Scalia concluded that Indiana's nudity statutes, from 1831 to
the present, were and always had been, generally applicable
laws .
4.

Enforcing TraditionalMoral Beliefs

After arguing that the statute was generally applicable based
on its text and history, Scalia looked at its purpose.8 0 He rejected
the dissent's assertion that the purpose of the statute was to protect nonconsenting parties from offense, and that because patrons
of the Kitty Kat Lounge and the Glen Theater were consenting
adults the only purpose that remained was to restrict expressive
conduct.8 ' Scalia argued that the dissent's analysis of the purpose
of the statute presupposed that offense to others is the only reason
for restricting nudity in public places.8 2 Instead, he argued, our
society prohibits certain activities not because they might harm
others, but because they are immoral.8 3 While some may disagree
as to whether these prohibitions should exist, or whether they are,
in fact, immoral, Scalia asserted that absent specific constitutional protection for the conduct, the Constitution does not prohibit the laws simply because they regulate morality.8 4
Scalia concluded that the purpose of the Indiana statute, as
demonstrated by its text and the manner in which it had been
enforced, was to enforce the "traditional moral belief that people
should not expose their private parts indiscriminately," regardless
of whether those who see them are offended.8 5 Underscoring this
point, Scalia stated that "[t]he purpose of Indiana's nudity law
would be violated . . . if 60,000 fully consenting adults crowded
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. at 573.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id.
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into the Hoosier Dome to display their genitals to one another,
86
even if there were not an offended innocent in the crowd."
5. The First Amendment and Expressive Conduct
Finally, Justice Scalia reiterated that because Indiana's
nudity statute is a generally applicablelaw, the First Amendment
is not implicated.8 7 Scalia conceded that the First Amendment
does protect expressive conduct where the government prohibits
the conduct precisely because of its expressive message., But,
Scalia pointed out, "[vlirtually every law restricts conduct, and
virtually any prohibited conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose-if only expressive of the fact that the actor disagrees with the prohibition," so it could not be said that every
restriction of expression produced by a general law must pass
First Amendment scrutiny. s 9
Scalia cited Employment Division v. Smith 90 as an example of
this generally applicable law analysis. Further, he stated that
86. Id. In dissent Justice White disagreed with Justice Scalia's assertion that
the statute at issue did not implicate the First Amendment. Justice White
stated:
We agree with Justice Scalia that the Indiana statute would not permit
60,000 consenting Hoosiers to expose themselves to each other in the
Hoosier Dome. No one can doubt, however, that those same 60,000
Hoosiers would be perfectly free to drive to their.., homes... and, once
there, to parade around, cavort, and revel in the nude for hours in front
of relatives and friends. It is difficult to see why the State's interest in
morality is any less in that situations, especially if, as Justice Scalia
seems to suggest, nudity is inherently evil, but clearly the statute does
not reach such activity ... the State's failure to enact a truly general
proscription requires closer scrutiny of the reasons for the distinctions
the State has drawn.
Id. at 595-96.
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id. at 577. Scalia cites the following as cases in which "expressive
conduct" has been protected speech for purposes of the First Amendment: United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning as protected speech); Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (same); and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students wearing of black arm
bands as a form of protest as protected speech). See also Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(ordinance forbidding the slaughter of animals was not a generally applicable
law and governmental interest asserted failed to justify the targeting of the
religious activity).
89. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 577.
90. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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there is an even greater reason to apply the analysis to expressive
conduct because "[r]elatively few can plausibly assert that their
illegal conduct is being engaged in for religious reasons; but
almost anyone can violate almost any law as a means of expression." 9 1 Scalia concluded that "[in the one case, as in the other, if
the law is not directed against the protected value . .. the law
must be obeyed." 92 The Rule of Law is, after all, a law of rules.
Speech is speech, nudity is nudity, and nude dancing is just that,
dancing-nothing more, and nothing less.
C. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District
Nowhere is Scalia's preference for the Rule of Law more
clearly evidenced than in his First Amendment Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District,9 3 Scalia wrote a concurring opinion to once
again advocate for the death of the Lemon three-part balancing
94
test.
In Lamb's Chapel, Petitioner, a church, brought suit alleging
that the Respondent school district had violated its constitutional
rights by refusing the church's request to use school facilities to
show a film series on family values and child-rearing. 95 Section
414 of New York's education law authorized school boards to adopt
reasonable regulations for the use of school property. 96 Among
the permitted uses were "social, civic, and recreational meetings. " 9 7 These meetings were to be non-exclusive and open to the
general public. 98 Specifically, Rule 7 of these regulations, consistent with New York state law, provided that the school premises
could not be used for religious purposes. 99
91. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 579.
92. Id.
93. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
94. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (In order to defeat an
Establishment Clause challenge, the defendant must prove that the law in issue:
(1) is primarily secular in purpose; (2) does not have a principal or primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) that the law does not foster an
excessive entanglement with religion.).
95. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 389
96. Id. at 386.
97. New York Education Law § 414(c).

98. Id.
99. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387.
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Petitioner twice submitted a request to use the school facilities to show the above referenced film series. 100 Twice this
request was denied. 10 1 Petitioner brought suit in District Court
alleging violations of the Freedom and Assembly Clauses, the
Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, as well as the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 2
The District Court rejected all of these claims, and granted
Respondent's motion for summary judgment. 10 3 The court characterized the school district's facilities as a limited public forum, and
noted that Rule 7 explicitly prohibited the use of school facilities
for religious purposes.' 0 4 The court concluded that once a limited
public forum is opened to a particular type of speech, selective
denial of access to that forum is forbidden. 105 Noting that Responorganizations, the
dent had never opened its facilities to religious
06
court found no First Amendment Violation.1
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 10 7 The court
held that Respondent's facilities were a limited public forum open
for specific purposes only, thus allowing it to remain non-public
except for those specific uses.' 08 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the appellate court's decision was "questionable"
under the Court's previous decisions. 10 9
1.

The Majority and the Creature

Justice White, writing for the majority, found that Petitioner's denial of Respondent's request constituted a violation of
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and that showing
the film would not have been a violation of the Establishment
Clause. 110 The Court explained that the subject matter of the
film, family values and child-rearing, fell within the broad spec100. Id.
101. Id. at 388.
102. Id.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 390.

107. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381,
389 (2d Cir. 1992).

108. Id. at 386.
109. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 506 U.S. 1032

(1992).
110. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
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trum of permitted uses of the property, and that the denial of Petitioner's request could only have been based upon the religious
perspective of the film."' The Court held that while Respondent
could legally preserve the property under its control, once the
property was open to the public for such a broad spectrum of uses
the denial of Petitioner's request constituted a violation of the
First Amendment." 2 Much to the dismay of Justice Scalia, the
majority did not stop there with its analysis. The Court went on
to say that under the Lemon test, the showing of the film would
3
not have constituted an Establishment Clause violation.1
2.

Drive a Pencil Through the Creature'sHeart

Scalia agreed with the judgment of the Court, but could not
agree with the majority's reliance on Lemon. The Court's invocation of Lemon, a test in direct opposition to a Rule of Law both in
its substance and in its application, was more than Scalia could
tolerate. He analogized Lemon to a ghoul in a late-night horror
show, repeatedly returning from the dead." 4 He pointed out that
over the years, "no fewer than five of the currently sitting justices
have personally driven pencils through the creature's heart, " and
that he personally has done so repeatedly." 5
Scalia stated that the secret to the Lemon test's survival is
that it is "so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience)
when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the
tomb at will."" 6 He goes on to say that when the Lemon test
would strike down a practice it forbids, the Court uses it. 1 7 When
the Court wishes to uphold a practice it forbids, Lemon is simply
ignored." 8 Scalia cited numerous scholarly articles calling for the
death of Lemon," 9 and concluded that he will decline to apply
Lemon-whether it validates or invalidates the government
action in question-whenever and wherever he can.' 2 °
In advocating for the interment of the Lemon test, Scalia
seeks to extend the Rule of Law. His dislike of Lemon is consis111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 393.
at 395.
at 398.
at 399.

at 398-99.
id. at 399-400.
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tent with his preference for clear, predictable rules. It is consistent with a desire to give the lower courts clear rules with which
to decide cases. Lamb's Chapel was not Scalia's first, nor will it be
his last, call for the death of Lemon. 12 1 He has many pencils,
sharpened and ready, to drive through the heart of all creatures
which haunt the Rule of Law.
D.

On Taking a Leaf From Scalia's Rule of Law Book

Nowhere do liberals fear Justice Scalia more than in his abortion jurisprudence. On this issue Justice Scalia is said to be the
Chief Nightmare in the liberal anxiety closet. 1 2 2 Of the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade 123 Scalia has said that, "[tihe emptiness of
the 'reasoned judgment' that produced Roe is displayed in plain
view by the fact ... that the best the Court can do to explain how
it is that the word 'liberty' must include the right to destroy
human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply
decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice."' 2 4
Because of statements like this, liberals have predicted that
Scalia will be instrumental in overturning Roe v. Wade. 12 5 Liberals have, in fact, spent much time and effort in analyzing exactly
how and when Scalia will achieve this goal. 1 2 6 Perhaps, that time
121. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Scalia, J.,dissenting)
(Justice Scalia rejected the Court's argument that Lemon sacrifices clarity and
predictability for flexibility. Instead, he argued that it was time for the Court to
sacrifice some flexibility for clarity and predictability.).
122. See Young, supra note 6.
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2875 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
125. Accord Young, supra note 6, at 586. (Young quotes Professor Tribe as
saying that "Scalia's method is designed to overrule virtually all of the Court's
decisions protecting individual rights."); George Kannar, The Constitutional
Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L. J. 1297, 1309 (1990) (Professor Kannar
states that "Scalia plainly does reach conventionally 'conservative' positions on
abortion," but concedes that Scalia's "tone and his not infrequent outcome
'contradictions' suggest strongly that a facile focus on any supposed 'resultorientation' in explaining his approach to constitutional adjudication does not do
the Justice justice.").
126. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudenceand the Good
Society: Shades of Felix Frankfurterand the Harvard Hit Paradeof the 1950's,
12 CARDozo L. REV. 1799, 1815 (1991) (In this article, Professor Edelman
discusses a number of Justice Scalia's opinions, including those involving
abortion, and concludes that Justice Scalia's "world" is not one of judicial
restraint. Instead, as the title of the article suggests, he argues that Justice
Scalia wants to take us back in time with his jurisprudence, rather than forward.
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could have been better spent analyzing the value of clear legal
rules and the protections that they afford. Perhaps, that time
could have been better spent in borrowing a leaf from Justice
Scalia's Rule of Law Book.
"Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is constructed around the
problem of judicial discretion and what he calls 'the main danger'
in judging: the possibility 'that judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law.'" 1 2 7 While it is true that this rule-based
theory of the law may leave more room for discretion than Justice
Scalia is willing to admit, 128 the many legal scholars who 1criticize
29
Scalia's methodology fail to offer an objective alternative.
It is, for example, tempting for those who believe that the Bill
of Rights should be interpreted to provide broad freedoms to criticize Justice Scalia's rule-based view of the role of judges.1 " 0 "But,
this criticism of Justice Scalia's methodology stems from the
He concludes that "Itihe question about (Scalia's] jurisprudence is not whether it
will take us back in time. That is obvious. The question is how far he really
means to go if he can garner the votes to do so."); George Kannar, Strenuous
Virtues, Virtuous Lives: The Social Vision ofAntonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1845, 1866 (1991) (In his article, Professor Kannar states that "[blecause the
rigid application of his narrow judicial world-view so consistently leads Justice
Scalia to reach politically conservative results, .

.

. we have the strongest

inclination to believe that some overreaching vision must drive them." He
concludes, however, that "a Supreme Court Justice who attempts always to give
life to such a pure version of the general American sensibility may not be the one
who, in the long run, serves his or her country best."); Toby Golick, Justice
Scalia, Poverty and the Good Society, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1817, 1830 (1991).
Although Professor Golick's article deals with Justice Scalia's jurisprudence as it
relates to cases involving government benefits for the poor, he too predicts that
Scalia will achieve his conservative agenda. He states that:
It is not good enough in a 'good society' for the poor to be free to burn the
flag to protest their hunger, homelessness and oppression. In a good
society... no one should be without adequate food, clothing, or shelter
.... Lawyers and courts have a role in attaining the good society and...
can make some things better for the poor as we struggle towards this
goal. If we succeed, I fear it will be despite and not because of Mr.
Justice Scalia.
127. Larry Kramer, JudicialAsceticism, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1791 (1991)
In his article, Professor Kramer characterizes Justice Scalia's belief that judges
should renounce their own desires when interpreting the law as "judicial
asceticism." He does so because he believes that in Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence, "[flormalism, textualism, and originalism are only means: denial
and self-control are the reasons." Id. at 1794-97.
128. Id. at 1792.
129. See generally Young, supra note 6.
130. See Segall, supra note 6, at 1039.
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premise that unelevated, life-tenured federal, judges will secure
those social goals more frequently than elected, accountable public
officials." 131 Whether federal judges actually attain those goals is
not as certain as Scalia's critics would have us believe. The failure
of this criticism is the premise that the skills of a lawyer can
"make political choices for society in the name of a fictive constitution, as if the Supreme Court really were a superlegislature ...
132 No one should forget Plessy v. Ferguson,'3 Lochner v. New
York, 3 and A.L.A. Schlechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,3 5
all of which were decided by the Supreme Court but which are
now viewed as decisions contrary to the general social welfare.
Nor, should we forget the lesson of Roe .136 Those who favor
the outcome in Roe-scholars, judges, and lawyers alike-would
do well to recognize the inherent weaknesses in the majority's
analysis in Roe.' 37 The opinion, while giving extraordinary detail
131. Id.
132. Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as a Mirror: Tribe's Constitutional
Choices, 84 MICH. L. REV. 551, 567 (1986) (review of Professor Tribe's book,
CONSTrrUTIONAL CHOICES (University Press 1995)). Judge Posner finds that the

failure of the book, much like the failure of Tribe's constitutional analysis, is in
its method, a method which advocates for a Supreme Court that is, or should be,
a superlegislature making political choices for our society. Posner goes on to
criticize the style of Tribe's writing when he says that:
These faults of style... are not unrelated to the book's substanice. They
pad and bedazzle, and if one stripped them away one would lay bare a
slim and unimpressive substance, the literary counterpart to a shaven
Persian cat. Also, a writer's style indicates, if not always the quality of
his (or her) thought, always the character of his culture.
Id.
133. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating a federal law that prohibited
slavery in some parts of the United States).
134. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York law limiting the hours of
bakery employees).
135. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down New Deal legislation which promoted
fair competition).
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of Untied States
Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age and Class, 1991 DUKE L. J. 324,
356 ("Many feminists criticized the Court's privacy approach [in Roe], because it
could not protect the most disadvantaged women from coercive anti-abortion
regulations); Ruth Bader-Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 386 (1985) ("Overall, the Court's
Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the opinion's concentration on a medically
approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality
perspective."); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 1020 (1984) ("The rhetoric of privacy, as opposed to equality, blunts our
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as to the history of abortion, makes no effort "to use the statutory
exception for abortions necessary for the protection of the mother's
life to drive a wedge between fetal life and other human life;" it
makes no effort "to relate the right of abortion to the right of marital privacy recognized in Griswold, and finally, it makes no effort
to identify the "constitutional provenance of a right to abortion...
"138 Had Roe been premised on clear legal rules rather than a
"balancing test," on predictability rather than uncertainty, perhaps a woman's right to choose would not still be so heatedly
debated, challenged and litigated.
Justice Scalia's preference for predictability and consistency
is, in the end, based "on the idea that general rules can, for future
cases, separate the legal from the personal, the objective from the
subjective." 13 9 Perhaps, therefore, his critics need to ask themselves whether clear legal rules are such an enemy to them and to
their causes. For clear legal rules, whether written by Justice
Antonin Scalia or Justice William Brennan, provide a significant
measure of protection. At a minimum, clear rules tend to ensure
protections beyond the Court's next term, beyond the next presidential election, and beyond the selection of new Supreme Court
Justices.
II.

THE PROPHET OF DOOM:

A LONE VOICE ON SEPARATION-OF-

POWERS

'What the people care about, what affects them is the Bill of Rights
....That is a profoundly mistaken view ....For the fact is, that it

is the structure of the government, its constitution,in the real sense
of the word, that ultimately destroys freedom. The Bill of Rights is
not more than ink on paper unless ... itisaddressed to a government which is so constituted that no partof it can obtain excessive
power..

..'4

The separation-of-powers doctrine guarantees the structural
integrity necessary for our democratic system of government.
Scholars have examined this doctrine from every angle, searching
ability to focus on the fact that it is women who are oppressed when abortion is
denied. .. ").

138. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 337 (1992).
139. Segall, supra note 6, at 1041.
140. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
COURT'S

CONSERVATIVE

AND

THE SUPREME

MovEMENT 41 (1993) (quoting Remarks of Justice

Antonin Scalia at Washington D.C. Panel Discussion on Separation of Powers
(audio tape of C-SPAN broadcast, November 15, 1988)).
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for its meaning and parameters. 14 1 Much as these scholars have
searched for a meaning, the Supreme Court has zigzagged back
and forth, creating a patch-work of decisions in its own interpretation of the doctrine. In I.N.S. v. Chada1 42 and Bowsher v.
Synar, 4 3 for example, the Court applied a rigid, formalistic
approach to strike down so called "legislative veto" practice and
balanced budget legislation. Just a few years later, however, in
Morrison v. Olson14 4 and Mistretta v. United States,145 the Court
applied a much more functional, flexible methodology in upholding the independent counsel law and the United States Sentencing Commission legislation.
Separation-of-power scholars, like the Court, are largely
divided into two groups: formalists and functionalists. Formalists
interpret the doctrine to mean that the powers of the government
are divided into three "wholly and independent" branches: Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary. 1 4 6 When determining
whether the doctrine has been violated, formalists ask whether a
branch has acted "within the scope of its authority." 4 7 The question is not how far over the line of separation a branch has
stepped, but whether it has stepped over at all. If it has, the doctrine has been violated unless the action has been explicitly
authorized by the text of the Constitution. 4
Functionalists reject this line-drawing interpretation of the
doctrine. Instead, they believe that the question is whether the
action has disrupted the balance of power between the
branches.'49 The question is not whether a branch has stepped
141. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE. L.
REV. 1725 (1996); Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separationof Powers, 70 TUL.
L. REV. 2681 (1996); Joann C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The
Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 5 (1995);
Phillip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fallof the Doctrine of Separationof Powers, 85
MICH. L. REV. 592 (1986)
142. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
143. 487 U.S. 714 (1986).
144. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). For a more detailed
discussion of the division between formalist and functionalist theories of
separation-of-powers on the Court, and of those two theories generally, see
Matthew James Tanielian, Comment, Separation of Powers and the Supreme
Court: One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 961 (1995).
147. See Olson, 487 U.S. at 705.
148. See I.N.S v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 955-56 (1983).
149. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
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over the line of separation, but how far. So long as the "stepping"
does not prohibit a branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned tasks, and so long as the impact of the action is justified
by an overriding interest within the constitutional authority of
that branch, 150 the overstepping by one branch is not constitutionally excessive.
Justice Scalia is a formalist whose separation-of-powers jurisprudence has earned him a reputation as the "Prophet of
Doom."' 51 Scalia served in the Office of Legal Counsel in the mid1970's,152 an office which advises the President on separation-ofpowers issues. As an assistant attorney general in that office, he
53
testified before Congress in opposition to the legislative veto.'
According to one author, "Assistant Attorney General Scalia was a
willing knight well prepared to ride into battle... [Scalia] had no
doubts in his own mind about the legislative veto's unconstitutionality, and had no hesitancy in speaking his mind to anyone who
would listen." 5 4 Additionally, Scalia advocated a formalistic
15 5
interpretation of the doctrine while a law school professor,
while serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 5 6 and he has continued to do so since coming to
the Court. He himself has commented that "[i]f there is anyone
who, over the years, has had a greater interest in the subject of
separation of powers, he does not come readily to mind." 5 7
As the lone dissenter in Morrison and Mistretta, perhaps
Scalia is a prophet of doom. Prophet or not, however, he is consis150. See id.
151. See Schultz & Smith, supra note 3, at 82.
152. See Smith, supra note 122, at 39. (citing BARBARA CRAIG, CHADA: THE
STORY OF AN Epic CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 53 (1988)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Demonstrating his commitment to the Separation of Powers even before
being appointed to the bench, Scalia wrote a law review article criticizing the
legislative veto. See Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for
System Overload, 3 REG. 19 (Nov./Dec. 1979). Additionally, Scalia authored the
amicus curae brief opposing the constitutionality of the legislative veto which
was submitted by the American Bar Association in I.N.S. v. Chada. See ScHULTz
& SMITH, supra note 3, at 83. Finally, Scalia wrote an article on standing as an
element of separation of powers while a judge on the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 881 (1983).

156. See id.
157. See ScmYLTz & SMITH, supra note 3, at 84.
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tent. In his advocacy for clear lines, whether they are drawn in
the sand or in the Constitution, "[the rule of law.. .animates his
separation-of-powers decisions."1""
A. Morrison v. Olson
The Respondents in Morrison v. Olson 159 were three former
government officials who were the recipients of grand jury subpoenas issued by independent counsel Alexia Morrison. 1 60 Respondents challenged the appointment of Morrison 16 under § 592 of
the Ethics in Government Act (hereinafter the Act),' 6 2 which
allows for the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute high ranking government officials for violations of federal criminal laws. 163 The Act requires the Attorney
General to investigate persons covered by the Act who may have
violated federal criminal law.16 4 When the Attorney General has
completed the investigation, he or she must report to a special
court created by the Act "for the purpose of appointing independent counsels."' 6 5 If the Attorney General determines that there
are reasonable grounds for further investigation, he must apply to
the court for the appointment of independent counsel.' 6 6 Upon
receipt of the application, the special court appoints an appropri1 67
ate independent counsel and defines that counsel's jurisdiction.
If the Attorney General finds insufficient grounds for further
court has no authority to appoint an
investigation, the special
168
independent counsel.

An independent counsel, once appointed, has full power to
investigate, prosecute, or dismiss matters within her jurisdiction. 1 69 An independent counsel may be removed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) which provides:
158. Price Marshall, supra note 6.
159. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
160. See id. at 668.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660.
Id. at 660-61.
Id. at 661.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 28 U.S.C. §§ 594(a) & 594(g) respectively.
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An independent counsel . . . may be removed from office, other
than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action
of the Attorney General and only for good cause ....
Finally, the Act provides for Congressional oversight of the
170
independent counsel's activities.
When served with subpoenas from Petitioner, Respondents
moved to quash the subpoenas claiming that the independent
counsel provisions of the Act were an unconstitutional violation of
the separation-of-powers doctrine.' 7 ' The district court upheld
the constitutionality of the Act and denied Respondents'
motion. 17 2 The Respondents were subsequently held in contempt
of court for refusing to comply with the subpoenas. 7 3 The district
7 4
court stayed the contempt orders pending an expedited appeal.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, holding the Act violated the Appointments
Clause because it did not provide for the independent counsel to
be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, a
officers. 1 75 The Supreme Court
requirement for all "principal" 176
granted certiorari and reversed.
1.

A Majority of Functionalists

In its analysis, the Court first found that the independent
counsel was an inferior officer for purposes of the Appointments
Clause. 1 7 7 The Court also stated that the Act was not an attempt
by Congress to gain a role in the removal of an executive official."'7 Instead, the Act "puts the removal power squarely in the
hands of the Executive Branch" because the independent counsel
could only be removed by the personal action of the Attorney General. 1 79 Additionally, the Court found that the "good cause"
removal provision of the Act did not impermissibly burden the
President's power to control the independent counsel.18 0
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 668 (1988).
Id.
In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. 1988).
Id.
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (U.S. App. D.C. 1988).
Morrison v Olson, 484 U.S. 1058 (1988).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
Id. at 686.
Id. at 692.
Id.
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The Court also found that the Act did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine."' 1 Applying a functional approach to the
doctrine, the Court stated that the Act did not involve an attempt
by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch. 8 2 The Court gave cursory attention to the fact that
certain members of Congress could request the Attorney General
to appoint an independent counsel, finding that8 3the Attorney General had no duty to comply with the request.1
Similarly, the Court found that the Act did not constitute a
judicial usurpation of executive functions.18 4 Emphasizing that
the independent counsel is an "inferior" officer, the Court stated
that the power to appoint such officers is not an executive function
"in the constitutional sense."'8 5 Nor, did the Court find that the
Act impermissibly undermined the power of the Executive
Branch. 8 6 While the Court acknowledged that the Act reduced
the amount of control that the Attorney General, and through
him, the President, exercised over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity, the Court
pointed out that the Attorney General could not appoint the individual of his choice as independent counsel; could not determine
the counsel's jurisdiction; his power to remove a counsel was limited; and he retained the power to remove the counsel for "good
cause." 18 7 Thus, the Court concluded that the Act was
constitutional. "8

2. A Fundamentalist,A Government of Laws, and the Wolf
Scalia began his dissent by stating that "[iut is the proud boast
of our democracy that we have 'a government of laws and not of
men.'" 8 91 Citing Article II, § 1, clause 1 of the Constitution, Scalia
reiterated that the text says that executive Power shall be vested
in the President of the United States of America.' 90 Scalia then
looked to the Framers of the Federal Constitution for support for
his formalist approach to the separation-of-powers doctrine. Cit181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 695.

185. Id.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 695-96.
Id.
Id. at 697. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 698.
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ing James Madison's Federalist Number 51, Scalia recognized
that the words of the Constitution are not self-effectuating, but
that they must be fortified.19 1 In the case of Executive Power,
Scalia argued, that fortification is in the form of the presidential
veto power and, more importantly, in the Founders refusal to
92
1
weaken the Executive Power.

Unlike the legislative Powers which are divided into the Senate and the House of Representatives, Scalia noted, there is no
such division of the Executive Powers. 193 And that, Scalia, stated,
is what this case was all about. Power. Scalia warned the Court
that "[firequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court
clad.., in sheep's clothing: the potential of the asserted principle
to effect change in the equilibrium of power is not immediately
evident... But this wolf comes as a wolf."
3. From Back to Front and Front to Back
Scalia discovered this wolf, boldly displaying itself, in the history and text of the Act. Having reviewed many of the same provisions of the Act that the majority did, Scalia came to a much
different conclusion about its allocation of power.19 4 He stated
that the application of the statute in the present case effectively
compelled a criminal investigation of a high-level presidential
appointee.' 9 5 Further, Scalia stated that in accordance with the
Act the scope of that investigation, its duration, and the decision
to prosecute are beyond the control of the President and his
96
subordinates. 1

Scalia dismissed the majority's attention to the technical
details of the Appointments Clause and the removal power as
being backwards. 197 He stated that "[i]f to describe this case is not
to decide it, the concept of a government of separate and coordinate powers no longer has any meaning."198 Scalia, therefore, continued his analysis by looking first at the separation of powers,
191. Id.

192. Id. at 698-99.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 701-03.
195. Id. at 703.

196. Id.
197. Id. at 704.
198. Id. at 703.
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and then only briefly, at the Court's appointments clause and
removal jurisprudence. 1 99
4.

Who Has the Power?

After reminding the majority that where an issue pertains to
separation-of-powers the Court owes no deference to Congress'
view that what it has done is constitutional, Scalia applied the
following test for determining who has the power: (1) Is the conduct of a criminal prosecution (and of an investigation to decide
whether to prosecute) the exercise of purely executive power?
and, (2) Does the statute deprive the President of the United
20 0
States of exclusive control over the exercise of that power?
In analyzing the first part of this test, Scalia noted that even
the majority conceded that the functions performed by the
independent counsel were law enforcement functions typically
undertaken by the Executive Branch.2 0 ' Scalia easily determined,
therefore, that there was no possible doubt that the independent
counsel's functions were, in fact, executive.20 2 Analyzing the second,-part of the test, Scalia stated that the majority did not, and
could not, assert that the Act did not deprive the President of
20 3
exclusive control over quintessentially executive activity.
While the majority pointed out that the President, through the
Attorney General, has "some" control-the power to remove the
counsel for good cause-Scalia retorted that "[t]his is somewhat
like referring to shackles as an effective means of locomotion."20 4
Citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States20 5 as support,
Scalia stated that limiting removal power to "good cause" is an
impediment to, not an effective grant of, Presidential control.20 6
Scalia concluded that neither the removal power nor any of the
"less important" controls that the President retained were relevant, because the case was over when the Court acknowledged
that the Act reduced the amount of control or supervision that the
President had over the investigation and prosecution of a certain
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 704.
See id. at 704-05.
Id. at 705-06.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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class of alleged criminal activity.20 7 Scalia concluded that "[i]t is
not for us to determine, and we may never presume to determine,
how much of the purely executive powers of the government must
be within the full control of the president. The Constitution proscribes that they all are."2 °8
5.

Checks and Balances and the Unfettered Wisdom of the
Majority

In what is probably the most criticized portion of his dissent,
Scalia had no difficulty with the President having the exclusive
power to investigate himself.2 0 9 Scalia found this no more difficult
than the idea that Congress has the exclusive power to legislate,
and no more difficult than the Court having the exclusive power to
determine the justiciability of a statute reducing the salaries of its
Justices.2 10
After finding that there are sufficient checks on such abuses
of power-retaliation by one of the other branches use of its exclusive powers and the political check that the people will replace
those in the political branches-Scalia stated that "[a] system of
separate and coordinate powers necessarily involves an acceptance of exclusive power that can theoretically be abused ....
While the separation of powers may prevent us from righting
every wrong, it does so in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty."2 1 1 Scalia warned that the majority's decision replaced the
clear constitutional prescription that the executive power belongs
to the President with a "balancing test" which had no discernible
stopping place.2 12 Scalia also warned that the effect of the Act on
the President was twofold. First, it deeply wounds the President
by substantially reducing his ability to protect himself and his
staff 213 And second, the institution of the independent counsel
"enfeebles him more directly... by eroding his public support."2 1 4
"Evidently," Scalia concluded, "the governing standard is to
be what might be called the unfettered wisdom of a majority of
this Court, revealed to an obedient people on a case-by-case basis.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 708 (citing majority opinion at 696).
Id. at 709.
Id. at 710.
Id.

211. Id. at 710-11.

212. Id. at 711.
213. Id. at 713.
214. Id.
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This is not only not the government of laws that the Constitution
established, it is not a government of laws at all."2 15 For these
reasons, Scalia found that the Act was an unconstitutional violation of separation-of powers.2 1 6
6. On Grieving for the Constitution
Finally, Scalia analyzed the constitutionality of the Act under
the Appointments Clause and the President's removal power. In
contrast to the majority, Scalia found that the independent counsel was not, in fact, an "inferior officer."2 1 7 Scalia stated that the
majority's argument that the independent counsel was an "inferior officer" because he or she is more difficult to remove than most
principle officers, would be like saying that the President is "inferior" to Congress. 2 18 Additionally, Scalia rejected the majority's
2 19
argument that the independent counsel's duties are "limited"
and that the limited nature of the independent counsel's jurisdiction and tenure made her an inferior officer.2 2 °
Finally, Scalia resorted to his favorite source for determining
the meaning of a term, the dictionary. Scalia explained that the
discretionary meaning of inferior is "subordinate," plainly connoting a relationship of subordination.2 2 ' Scalia found this definition
to be consistent with the Court's own precedent. In United States
v. Nixon,2 2 2 the Court explicitly stated that the Watergate Special
Prosecutor was a "subordinate officer" because the President, or
the Attorney General could have removed him at any time.2 2 3
While Scalia conceded that an inferior officer, by definition, does
not have to be subordinate to a principal officer, he said that "it is
surely a necessary condition for inferior officer status that the
officer be subordinate to another officer." 224 Finding that the
independent counsel was not even subordinate to the President,
Scalia concluded that "she was not an 'inferior' officer and her
215. Id. at 712.

216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 716.
219. Id. at 717-18. See also id. at n.3, which lists, in detail, the independent
counsel's enumerated powers.

220. Id.
221. Id. at 721.
222. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

223. Id. at 696.
224. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 722 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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appointment other than by the President with
the advice and con225
sent of the Senate" was unconstitutional.

Scalia declined to discuss at length why the restrictions upon
the removal of the independent counsel were also unconstitutional, and instead commented on the effect of the majority's opinion on the Court's jurisprudence regarding removal of officials.226
Conceding that there is no constitutional provision stating who
may remove executive officers except for references to impeachment, Scalia reiterated that it was, nonetheless, well established
that the President's power to remove principal executive officers
who exercised purely executive functions was absolute,227 while
his power to remove inferior officers who exercise purely executive
functions could be restricted.2 28
Scalia pointed out, however, that since the Court's decision in
Humphrey's Executor the permissible restriction upon removal of
principle officers has been the point at which the powers exercised
by those officers are no longer purely executive. 229 The majority's
analysis, according to Scalia, removed this restriction and simply
stated that Congress cannot interfere with the President's exercise of the executive power and his constitutionally appointed duty
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.23 ° Scalia stated
that while '[o]ne can hardly grieve for the shoddy treatment given
today to Humphrey'sExecutor, which, after all, accorded the same
indignity . . . to Chief Justice Taft's opinion ten years earlier
in Myers v. United States . . . one must grieve for the
23
Constitution." 1

Scalia, the Prophet of Doom, declared that the Court's decision permanently encumbered the Republic with an institution
that would do it great harm. 23 2 "Worse than what it has done," he
warned, "is the manner in which it has done it. A government of
laws means a government of rules. Today's decision . . . is
ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law."23
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 723.
Id.
Id. at 723 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
Id. at 723-24 (citing United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886)).
Id. at 724.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 725-26.
Id. at 733.
Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Mistretta v. United States
It was not long before the Prophet of Doom spoke again. Less
than one year after the Court decided Morrison, it took up Mistretta v. United States. 234 At issue in Mistretta was the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter "the
Guidelines") promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter "the Commission."). 2 35 The Petitioner was
indicted, along with another man, in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts of "centering a cocaine sale."2 3 6 Petitioner moved to have the Guidelines
ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that the Commission was
constituted in violation of the doctrine of separation-of-powers and
that Congress delegated excessive authority to the Commission to
structure the Guidelines.2 3 7
The district court rejected Petitioner's delegation argument
on the grounds that the Commission should be judicially characterized as having Executive Branch status, and on the basis that
the Guidelines are similar to substantive rules promulgated by
other agencies. 23 8 The court also rejected Petitioner's claim that
the Act was unconstitutional because it required Article III federal judges to serve on the Commission. 2 39 The court did, however, express some doubts about "parts of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the legality of their anticipated operation."2 4 0
Petitioner appealed to the Eighth Circuit, but both the Petitioner
and the United States, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 18, petitioned the Court for certiorari review before judgment in the
Court of Appeals. 2 4 1 Because of the "imperative public importance" 2 42 of the issue, and because of the extensive split among
234. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
235. The Commission was created under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
18 U.S.C. § 3551-3559 (1982 & Supp. IV), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1982 &
Supp. IV).
236. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
237. Id.
238. United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
239. Id.

240. Id.
241. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371.
242. Supreme Court Rule 18 requires that the issue on appeal be one of
"imperative public importance" in order for certiorari to be granted. In a
footnote, the Court noted that the disarray among the District Courts was made
more imperative by a subsequent split among the Courts of Appeal. Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 371 n.6.
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United States District Courts, the Court granted review before
judgment.2 4 3
1.

The Majority and An Unusual Hybrid in Structure and
Authority
After reviewing the history of federal sentencing in this country, the Court first stated that determining the scope and extent of
punishment through sentencing has never been the exclusive
jurisdiction of one branch. 24 41 The Court went on to describe the
precursor to the Guidelines-indeterminate sentencing-which,
the Court pointed out, often led to serious disparities in sentencing.2 4 5 It was these disparities, which led to the creation of
mandatory sentencing guidelines.2 46 The Guidelines which were
ultimately promulgated, explained the Court, were meant to
establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of
offenses and defendants according to certain factors.2 4 v
The Court went on to outline the establishment of the Commission "as an independent commission in the judicial branch of
the United States," and to explain its make-up.2 48 The Commission is made-up of seven voting members, at least three of whom
are required to be federal judges. The Attorney General, or his
designee, is a non-voting member. 24 9 The Chairman and other
members of the Commission are subject to removal by the President "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other
good cause shown." 250 And, each voting member serves for six
years, and may not serve more than two full terms. 2 5 ' Finally, the
Commission is responsible for the promulgation of determinative
sentencing guidelines, and has an obligation to review and revise
them.2 5 2
a. Common Sense and the Nondelegation Doctrine
In its analysis of Petitioner's arguments, the Court first
rejected his argument that delegating the power to promulgate
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 368.
28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 992(a)-(b).
28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
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sentencing guidelines to the Commission constituted an impermissible delegation of legislative power.2 53 Recognizing that the
nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation-ofpowers, the Court nonetheless found that this principle does not
prevent Congress from obtaining the "assistance" of its coordinate
Branches. 2 ' Applying a functionalist approach to the issue, the
Court quoted Chief Justice Taft when it said that in determining
what Congress may do when it seeks assistance from another
branch, "the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed
according to common sense .... 255

Applying this "broad" principle to the case before it, the Court
found that Congress' delegation of authority to the Commission
was constitutional.2 5 s
The Majority, Madison, and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine
The Court also rejected Petitioner's argument that the Act
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine.2 57 Ironically, in seeking to "give life to" the Framers view of the appropriate relationship among the Branches, the majority quoted from Humphrey's
Executor, which held that each of the three Branches must remain
"entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others."258 Additionally, the Court stated that
the Framers "did not require-indeed rejected-the notion that
b.

the three Branches must be entirely separate and distinct." 25 9 As

support for this statement, however, the Court did not cite the
Framers, instead, it cited its own decisions in Nixon v. Adminis261
trator of General Services260 and United States v. Nixon.
In concluding that the Act did not violate separation-of-powers principles, the Court once again invoked the Framers when it
said that by "adopting this flexible understanding of the separation of powers, we simply have recognized Madison's teaching that
253. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371.
254. Id. at 372.
255. Id. (citing J.W. Hampton Jr., Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406
(1928)).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 384.
258. Id. at 380 (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
629 (1935)).
259. Id.
260. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
261. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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the greatest security against tyranny-the excessive accumulation of power in a single Branch-lies not in a hermetic division
among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked
2 62
and balanced power within each Branch."
c.

Location, Location, Location

The Court also rejected Petitioner's argument that the location and composition of the Commission violated separation-ofpowers principles.26 3 Although the Court admitted that the Commission is "unquestionably ... a peculiar institution within the
framework of our Government," it found that the Commission is
not a court and does not exercise judicial power.2 6 4 Instead, the
Court stated that the Commission is an "independent" body, and
that the mere "anomaly" or "innovation" of its placement in the
Judicial Branch does not violate separation-of- powers.26 5
The Court also acknowledged that under Article III the judicial power of the United States is limited to "cases" or "controversies," but found that just as separation-of-powers is not violated
when courts promulgate rules of procedure, neither is it violated
when they promulgate "rules of sentencing." 266 The Court held
that the location of the Commission was constitutional and that
such placement could not possibly be construed as preventing the
Judicial Branch from accomplishing its constitutional
functions.2 6 7
Additionally, the Court held that the composition of the Commission did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. 268 After
reiterating that the Commission is not a court and thus exercises
no judicial power, the Court "inferred" from the text of the Constitution and from precedent that Article III judges are not prohibited from undertaking extrajudicial duties. 2 6 9 The Court held that
"the principle of separation-of-powers does not absolutely forbid
Article III judges from serving on commissions such as that created by the Act ,"270 and that while the Court was "somewhat
262. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381.
263. Id. at 390.
264. Id. at 385.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 385-93.
267. Id. at 395-96 (citing Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Svcs., 433 U.S. 425,
443 (1977)).

268. Id. at 408.
269. Id. at 398-404.
270. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
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troubled by petitioner's argument that the Judiciary's entanglement in the political work of the Commission undermines public
confidence in the.. Judicial Branch, that danger is far too remote
for consideration here."27 '
d. A Fanciful Notion of PresidentialControl
Finally, the Court rejected Petitioner's argument that the Act,
which empowers the President to appoint and remove the members of the Commission, prevented the Judicial Branch from performing its constitutionally assigned duties.272 In fact, the Court
concluded that "[t]he notion that the President's power to appoint
federal judges to the Commission somehow gives him influence
over the Judicial Branch ...is fanciful." 2 7 3 Similarly, the Court
found that because the President's removal power has no effect on
the tenure or compensation of Article III judges, he would have no
power to coerce judges in the exercise of their judicial duties.274
The Court concluded that "in creating the Sentencing Commission-an unusual hybrid in structure and authority-Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the
constitutionally mandated balance of powers...." The Court held
that the Act was, therefore, constitutional. 7 5
2. The Prophet of Doom Rises Again
After agreeing with the majority that Petitioner's nondelegation claim should be rejected because the scope of delegation is
largely uncontrolled by the courts, Scalia donned his guise as the
Prophet of Doom and wrote a scathing dissent.276 It is precisely
because the delegation doctrine is uncontrollable by the courts,
Scalia asserted, that the Court must "be... rigorous in preserving
the Constitution's structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation."277 "Lawful" delegation is not lawful simply because Congress is sometimes too busy and can therefore delegate its
lawmaking responsibility, Scalia argued, rather, it is that "a cer271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 407.
at 409.
at
at
at
at

411.
412.
416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
416-17.
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tain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most
executive or judicial action

"278

To support his argument, Justice Scalia quoted Justice
Harlan in Field v. Clark,279 and reminded the Court that:
The true distinction ... is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution
....The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can
be made.28 °
Additionally, Scalia pointed out that the lawmaking function
of the Commission is completely divorced from any execution of
the law, any adjudication of private rights under the law, and
from any exercise of judicial powers.281
It is divorced, Scalia argued, not only because it is not said to
be "located in the Executive Branch," but because the Commission
exercises no executive power on its own and it is not subject to the
control of the President, who does. 28 2 And the Commission's law-

making is divorced from judicial powers, Scalia argued further,
because it is not a court itself, it has no judicial powers itself, and
it is not subject to any other body of judicial powers.28 3 Finally,
Scalia argued that because this delegation of lawmaking authority
is unsupported by any legitimate theory explaining why it is not a
delegation of legislative power, "[t]he power2 4to make law at issue
here ... is not ancillary but quite naked."
Scalia warned that by reason of the Court's decision, he anticipated that "Congress [would] find delegation of its lawmaking
powers much more attractive in the future ....How tempting to

create an expert Medical Commission... to dispose of such thorny
'no-win' issues as the withholding of life-support systems .. .or
the use of fetal tissue for research."2 8

5

He argued that the Court's

precedent was undemocratic not because of the scope of the delegated power, but because the recipient-the Commission-was
not one of the three Branches of Government. 28 6 "The only gov278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See id. at 417.
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
Id. at 693-94.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.

283. Id.
284. Id. at 421.
285. Id. at 422.
286. Id.
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ernmental power the Commission possesses," Scalia concluded, "is
the power to make law; and it is not Congress."2 8 7
3.

The Prophetand the Humphrey's Executor of the Judicial
Branch

Rejecting the Court's argument as to the location of the Commission, Scalia said that "[tihe strange character of the body that
the Court today approves, and its incompatibility with our constitutional institutions, is apparent from that portion of the Court's
opinion entitled 'Location of the Commission.'"28 Scalia was, he
said, "at a loss to understand why the Commission is 'within the
Judicial Branch.' 2 8 9 Scalia argued that the logical way to determine which Branch an agency belongs to is on the basis of who
290
controls it.
Admitting that the Court has previously approved the concept
of a "branchless agency," Scalia reminded the Court that this was
true only where the agency exercises no executive power .291 Citing
the Court's decision in Morrison, Scalia argued that over the
years, Humphrey's Executor has come to mean something quite
different-"not an 'independent agency' in the sense of an agency
independent of all three Branches, but an 'independent agency' in
the sense of an agency within the Executive Branch... independent of the control of the President."29 2 Finding the concept of an
independent agency in the Judicial Branch even more illogical
than one found in the Executive Branch, Scalia warned that
"[t]oday's decision may aptly be described as the Humphrey's Executor of the Judicial Branch, and. . . we will live to regret it."
4.

The Prophet and A Junior Varsity Congress

In conclusion Scalia argued, as he has repeatedly, that the
question is not how much commingling has occurred within the
Branches but, rather, whether there has been any commingling at
all.2 9 3 Responding to the majority's use of a quote by James
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at.423.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 423-24.
293. See id. at 426.
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Madison to support their decision, 29 4 Scalia said that Madison
would be "aghast" to hear his words used as justification for ignoring the carefully designed structure of the Constitution. 2 95 Issuing his final warning in the case, Scalia said:
I think the Court errs, in other words, not... because it mistakes
the degree of commingling, but because it fails to recognize that
this case is not about commingling, but about the creation of a new
Branch altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress. It may well
be that in some circumstances such a Branch is desirable... But
there are many desirable dispositions that do not accord with the
constitutional structure we live under. And in the long run the
improvisation of a constitutional2 96 structure on the basis of perceived utility will be disastrous.
Once again Scalia was the lone dissenter, the Prophet of
Doom, vigorously defending the structure of the Constitution and
predicting disastrous consequences for a Court, and for a Nation,
which fails to defend the separation-of-powers.
C. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.
The Prophet of Doom's tenacity eventually paid off when in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,297 Scalia finally authored a
majority opinion in which he asserted his separation-of-powers
theory as law.
Petitioners in Plaut were investors who brought suit alleging
that Respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of
stock in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934298 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 299 Petitioners' case had not yet come to trial when the
Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, ° which held that "[liitigation instituted
pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 ... must be commenced within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation
294. The majority quoted Madison when they said that "separation of powers
'd[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency
in, or no control over the acts of each other.'" Id. at 380-81 (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, 325-26 (James Madison)).

295. Id.
296. Id. at 427.
297. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
298. 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
299. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1450.
300. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
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and within three years after such violation." 30 ' The Court applied
its holding to the plaintiff-respondents in Lampf and found their
suit to be untimely.3" 2 On the same day, the Court decided James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,303 which held that "a new rule
of federal law is applied to the parties in the case announcing the
rule must be applied as well to all cases pending on direct
review." 30 4 The district court in Plaut, applying the Lampf rule,
found that Petitioners' claims were untimely and dismissed their
action with prejudice on August 13, 1991.30 Petitioners filed no
appeal, and the judgment became final 30 days later.30 6
On December 19, 1991 President Bush signed the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.307 Sec-

tion 476 of the Act later became § 27A of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter § 27A). 30 This section provided for the reinstatement by motion of all actions filed pursuant
to § 10b of the Act which were commenced on or before June 19,
1991.309 The text of the pertinent section read:

(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title
that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991-(1) which was
dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and (2)
which would have been timely filed under the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall
be reinstated on motion by plaintiff not later than 60 days after
December 19, 1991.

On February 11, 1992, Petitioners moved the district court to
reinstate their claim.310 The district court found that the conditions of §§ 27A(b)(1) and (2) had been met, and granted Petitioners' motion. 3 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed,3 12 and the Supreme Court granted review.31 3
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 364.
Id.
501 U.S. 529 (1991).
Id.
Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1450.
Id. at 1451.
105 Stat. 2236.
Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1988 & Supp. V.).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa-1 (a)-(b).
Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1451.
Id.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (1993).
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On Bravely Reopening Final Judgments

Scalia began his analysis by rejecting Respondents "brave[ ]
conten[tion] that § 27A(b) does not require federal courts to reopen final judgments ....
"314 Respondents argued first that the
language of § 27A(b)-"the laws applicable in the jurisdiction...
as such laws existed before June 19, 1991"-could be construed to
refer to the limitations period provided in Lampf, in which case
Petitioners' action would have been time barred even under
§ 27A(b).3 15 Scalia responded that this argument confused the
question of what the law in fact was on June 19, 1991, with the
distinct question of what § 27A means by its reference to what the
3 16
law was.
Scalia found that there were two reasons why this reference
in § 27A did not refer to the law enunciated in Lampf. First,
because Lampf provided a uniform, national statute of limitations
instead of the applicable state statute of limitations, Scalia found
that "[i]f the statute referred to that law, its reference to 'laws
applicablein the jurisdiction'would be quite inexplicable." 1 7 Second, Scalia argued, if the statute referred to the law enunciated in
Lampf it would be utterly without effect, a result which would
"avoid a constitutional question by holding that Congress enacted
and the President approved a blank sheet of paper...."
Finally, Scalia rejected respondents alternative argument
that § 27A(b) did not require the reopening of final judgments
because the subsection applied only to cases still pending in the
federal courts when § 27A was enacted. 1 8 Scalia stated that this
argument had "only half of the defect of the first argument, for it
makes only half of § 27A purposeless-§ 27A(b)." 3 19 Scalia
pointed out that there is no need to "reinstate" actions that are
still pending, because § 27A(a) would be applied by the courts of
appeals.32 0 Finding that Respondents' argument would require
courts to disregard the language of the provision, Scalia concluded
that "there is no reasonable construction on which § 27A(b) does
not require federal courts to reopen final judgments in suits dis313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1451.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1452.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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missed with prejudice by virtue of Lampf."32 1 Brave or not, Scalia
found no merit in Respondents' arguments.
2.

The JudicialPower to Render Dispositive Judgments

Respondents also argued that § 27A(b) violated the separation-of-powers, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3 2 2 Scalia first determined that the former would be the
narrower ground for adjudication of a constitutional question
because the latter claim might dictate a similar result in a state
court challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 Scalia then
concluded that Congress exceeded its authority in § 27A(b) by
requiring the federal courts to exercise "'the judicial Power of the
United States' ... in a manner
repugnant to the text, structure,
"
and traditions of Article III. 324
Scalia pointed out that the Court's precedents to date had
identified only two types of legislation that require federal courts
to exercise judicial power in a manner that Article III normally
forbids.3 2 5 First, the Court has refused to "give effect to a statute
that... 'proscribed rules of decision to the Judicial Department of
the government in cases pending before it.'"3 26 Scalia explained
that this prohibition does not, however, have effect when Congress
merely "amend[s] applicable law."3 2 7 Scalia concluded that
§ 27A(b) does not set out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply, and therefore changes the law, even if only retroactively.3 2 1 Second, the Court has recognized that Congress cannot
"vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the
Executive Branch."3 2 9 Because under any application of § 27A(b)
only courts were involved, Scalia concluded that it offended
neither of these previously established prohibitions.3 3 0
Scalia went on, however, to find that § 27A(b) "offends a postulate of Article III just as deeply rooted in our law . . ."33'
He
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. (citing United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 146 (1872)).
327. Id. (citing Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 441
(1992)).
328. Id. at 1453.
329. Id. (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792)).
330. Id.
331. Id.
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found that Congress, by retroactively commanding the federal
courts to reopen final judgments, had violated the fundamental
principle that "'a judgment conclusively resolves the case' because
'a judicial Power' is one to render dispositive judgments.'"3 32
The Evils of A Judiciary Controlled By the Legislature
To support this conclusion, Scalia turned to the Framers'
experience, opining that "[t]he Framers of our Constitution lived
among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and judi3.

cial powers ....

-"3

Citing many examples of legislative correc-

tion of judgments during this time, Scalia asserted that "[vloices
from many quarters... decried the increasing legislative interference with the private-law judgments of the courts." 33 4 Scalia

quoted James Madison who, when describing the need for separation-of-powers, said that "[tihe legislative department is every
where extending its sphere of activity, and drawing all power into
its impetuous vortex." 33 5 Scalia argued that to the Framers, the
need for "separation of legislative from judicial power was plain,
the principle effect to be accomplished by that separation was
3 36

even plainer."

Scalia continued in his historical analysis, citing federal and
state decisions from the period immediately after ratification of
the Constitution as support for the premise that interference with
final judgments of the courts was forbidden. 33 Scalia stated that
"[b]y the middle of the 19th century, the constitutional equilibrium created by the separation of the legislative power to make
332. Id. (citing Frank Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40
905, 926 (1990)).
333. Id.

CASE

W. RES. L.

REV.

334. Id. Scalia cites an Address to the Council Censors of Vermont as an
example. In an address to the Freemen of the State, the Council reported that
the legislative branch had usurped greater power than it was entitled to by
"instances . . .of judgments being vacated by legislative acts." Vermont State
Papers 1779-1786 at 531-33 (Slade ed. 1823).
335. Id. at 1454.

336. Id.
337. Id. at 1455-56. Scalia cited the following cases for support for this
premise: Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 398 (1798) (In this case the Court noted that
in enacting a statute that set aside the final judgment of a state court, the
legislature of Connecticut was exercising judicial, not legislative power); Bates v.
Kimball, 2 Chipman 7, 90 (Vt. 1824) (In answering the question of whether the
legislature had the power to vacate or annul an existing judgment, the court held
that the power to annual a final judgment was an "assumption of Judicial
Power," and therefore forbidden).
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general law from the judicial power to apply that law ... was so
well . . . accepted that it could survive even Dred Scott v. Sanford33 8

.

.

.

."339

Quoting Abraham Lincoln, Scalia concluded

that although it is possible that a decision may be erroneous in
any given case, the chance of this "can be better borne than could
the evils of a different practice."3 4 °
4.

The Last Word of the JudicialDepartment

After concluding that § 27A(b) effected a clear violation of the
separation-of-powers doctrine, Scalia determined that even where
the legislation is retroactive, where it "requires its own application in a case already finally adjudicated, it does no more and no
less than 'reverse a determination once made, in a particular
case.'" 3 4 1 Scalia argued that the Court's precedence stemming
from Hayburn's Case, while not directly on point, "provided fair
warning that such an act exceeds the power of Congress."342
Next, Scalia acknowledged that Congress can revise decisions
of Article III courts in that new laws which are retroactive must
be applied to cases pending appeal. 34 3 He refused, however, to
extend this principle to finally adjudicated cases. 344 He concluded
that when a case has achieved finality, "a judicial decision
becomes the last word of the judicial department ... and Congress
may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable
to that very case was something other than what the courts said it
34 5
was."
5.

On Hypothetical HorriblesFlowing From Rigid Holdings

Scalia also rejected the Government's argument that Congress has previously set aside the final judgment of an Article III
338. 19 How. 393 (1857).
339. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1456.
340. Id. (quoting R. Basler, THE COLLECTED WORS OF ABRAHAM LINcoLN 268
(1953) (First Inaugural Address 1861)).
341. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, 545 (Alexander Hamilton)).
342. Id. (citing United States v. O'Grady, 22 Wall. 641, 647-48 (1875) (Judicial
jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a case, and . . . Congress
cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the re-examination and
revision of any other tribunal."); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 700-04
(decided in 1864, printed in 1885) (Taney, C.J.) (judgments of Article III courts
are "final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties.")).
343. Id. at 1457.
344. Id.
345. Id. (emphasis added).
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The Government argued that in United States v. Sioux
Nation3 4 7 the Court did just that. In Sioux Nation, the Court held
that separation-of-powers was not violated where a statute
required the Court of Claims to review Native Americans' claims
for just compensation on their merits, without regard to the
defense of res judicata.3 4 8
Scalia stated that the basis for the Court's finding was that
"Congress has the power to waive the res judicata effect of a prior
judgment entered in the Government's favor on a claim against
the United States" 3 49 and that trial courts may raise the res judicata bar on their own motion. 350 Therefore, Scalia argued,
"[w]aiver subject to the control of the courts themselves would
obviously raise no issue of separation of powers .... "351
Likewise, Scalia rejected Petitioners' argument that § 27A(b)
is similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which authorizes courts to relieve parties from a final judgment on grounds
such as excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, and
any other reason justifying relief.352 Scalia pointed out that while
the effect of the two might be similar, Rule 60(b) "'does not impose
any legislative mandate-to-reopen upon the courts, but merely
reflects and confirms the courts' own inherent and discretionary
power... to set aside a judgment whose enforcement would work
3 53
an inequity."
Scalia also responded to the dissent's "contemporary examples" of statutes that retroactively require final judgments to be
reopened.3 5 4 Scalia argued that none of the dissents examplesRule 60(b), the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act, and the Handicapped Children's Act-reopen final judgments.3 5 5 Scalia argued
further that the dissent's "perception that retroactive reopening
provisions are to be found all about ... reverses the traditional
rule ... that statutes do not apply retroactively unless Congress
expressly states that they do."35 6
court.

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

34 6

Id.
448 U.S. 371 (1980).
Id. at 397.
Id.
Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1459.
Id. at 1459.
Id. at 1460.
See id. and F.R.C.P. 60(b).
Plaut, 115 S.Ct. at 1460.
Id. at 1460-61.
Id. at 1461-62.
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Thus, Scalia concluded that there were no "hypothetical horribles flowing from our assertedly 'rigid holding.'"3 57 What is horrible, said Scalia, "is not ... our holding," but the underlying
statutes which enact "a 'rigid' jurisdictional bar to . . . untimely
3 58

civil petitions."

6. On High Walls, ClearDistinctions,& Good Fences
Finally, Scalia responded to the concurrence's suggestion that
the case should have been decided more narrowly. 59 While the
concurrence was willing to acknowledge that Congress sometimes
lacks the power under Article I to reopen final judgments, it considered the fact that § 27A(b) was retroactive and that it applied
only to a limited number of individuals to be critical.3 60 Scalia
argued that this was wrong in both fact and law.3 61 He said that
§ 27A(b) did not "single out" any defendant, but identified a class
of actions3 62 and that even if § 27A(b) had been applied prospectively, it would not have caused the statute to be less of an
infringement on judicial power. 363
While the concurrence agreed with the Court's judgment, it
did so only because § 27A(b) embodied the risk "of the very sort
our Constitution's 'separation of powers' prohibitions seek to
avoid."3 64 Scalia, the Prophet to the end, responded that "the doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard rather than
a remedy to be applied only when specific harm... can be identified .... [I]t is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and
357. Id. at 1462.
358. Id. In dissent, Justices Stevens and Ginsberg argued that the Court had
previously upheld similar remedial statutes that provoked no separation-ofpowers challenges. Id. at 1469. Additionally, they argued from a functionalist
perspective when they said that:
'We must remember that the machinery of government would not work

if it were not allowed a little play in the joints.' The three Branches
must cooperate in order to govern .... Rigid rules often make good law,
but judgments in areas such as the review of potential conflicts among
the three coequal Branches of the Federal Government partake of art as

well as science.
Id. at 1476 (citing Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931)

(Holmes, J.)).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1462-63.

364. Id. at 1463.
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clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will
36 5
not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict."
Holding that § 27A(b) was unconstitutional to the extent that it
required federal courts to reopen final judgments, Scalia, a victor
at last, ended his analysis by saying that "[sleparation of powers,
a distinctively American political doctrine, profits from... advice
authored by a distinctively American poet: Good fences make good
neighbors."3 6 6
D. A Prophet of Doom or A Guardianof Rights?
How one should characterize Justice Scalia's solitary voice
raising dire warnings of future harm if the separation of powers is
not respected is a good question. Is he a prophet? Is he a guardian of those things valuable to all, but recognized by few? Or is he
simply a historical gadfly, making unrealistic claims in the modern day world? Justice Scalia, prophet, guardian, or gadfly, firmly
believes that individual rights are best protected by the institutions of government.36 7 Further, he believes that the Court's failure to protect these institutions, a failure caused in part by the
Court's willingness to play the role of "latter day counsel of centhose institutions, but ultisors," will cause harm not only to
3 6
mately to the rights of individuals. 1
365. Id.
366. Id. (citation omitted). In his concurrence, Justice Breyer responded to
Justice Scalia's analysis and to his invocation of the poetry of Robert Frost when
he said:
[B]ecause the law before us both reopens final judgments... we need
not, and we should not, go further - to make of the reopening itself...
a foundation for the building of a new high walil] between the branches.
Indeed, the unnecessary building of such walls is, in itself, dangerous,
because the Constitution blends, as well as separates, powers .... As
the majority invokes the advice of an American poet, one might consider
as well that poet's caution, for he not only notes that 'Something there is
that doesn't love a wall,' but also writes, 'Before I built a wall rd ask to
know/ What I was walling in or walling out.'
Id. at 1466. (citing Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE NEW OxFoRD BOOK OF
AMERICAN VERsE 395-96 (R. Ellman ed., 1976)).
367. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 140, at 793 ("Fundamentally, Scalia sees
individuals' personal rights and liberties as resting upon the preservation of
clearly-divided authority between the branches of government."); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (In dissent, Scalia said that
"The purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the
unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government
but to preserve individual freedom.").
368. See generally Marshall, supra note 6.
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Scalia finds structural rigor preferable to the "vagaries of balancing tests" for maintaining the separation-of-powers doctrine.3 6 9 As with his preference for clear rules, Scalia believes
that the Constitution provides for clear lines, lines which delineate the roles for the three branches of government.37 ° One scholar
has said that Scalia's preference, like James Madison's, is based
on "realistic assumptions about individuals and about the governments peopled by those individuals."3 7 1 Likewise, Scalia's warnings to the Court are based on his fear that the Court has
unleashed the wolf-Congress-by not appreciating its voracious
appetite for power.3 72
While some may criticize Scalia's separation-of-powers jurisprudence as being unnecessarily rigid, Scalia himself recognizes
that the edges of each branch's sphere of power are not entirely
clear. 373 Unlike his critics, however, Scalia is "willing to travel
only a short distance from the command of the text" of the constitution when he analyzes those edges.3 74 While a majority of the
Court may believe that there is enough "flexibility" in the Constitution to allow for commingling among the branches, "for Justice
Scalia the issue is clear-cut: the Court's obligation is to enforce the
role
existing framework. To do otherwise is to mistake the judicial
71
framer."1
the
of
that
for
worse,
or
advocate,
the
of
for that
In his article about Scalia and the institutions of government,
Christopher Smith states that "[a]lthough Scalia's warnings about
the consequences of the Supreme Court's recent separation of
powers jurisprudence have not come to identifiable fruition ...
Justice Scalia who raised concerns about preserving individual
liberty in the separation of powers context, has been an active participant in many recent cases limiting the scope of individual
rights."3 7 6 Smith asserts that the very dangers that Scalia
warned the Court about have occurred -not because of the
Court's separation-of-powers decisions-but because of "conscious
decisions by politically conservative justices."3 7 7 Further, Smith
says that if Scalia "is so consistent and thoughtful in his role as
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Id. at 252.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 253.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 706.

374. See Marshall, supra note 6, at 257.
375. Id. at 259.
376. Smith, supra note 140, at 800.

377. Id. at 801.
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self-appointed institutional guardian... he should be more care-

ful that his behavior and tone do not lead him to fulfill... the dire
prophecies... that he so loudly trumpets.3 78
Smith, like many of Scalia's critics, fails to see that Scalia's
opinions affecting individual rights are consistent with his separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Scalia decides cases as he does precisely because to do otherwise would violate the line which
separates the role of the judiciary from the role of the other
branches, and precisely because doing so preserves individual
rights. Scalia's critics need look no further than his opinion in
Smith II for verification of this consistency. If he were truly
intent on doing nothing more than effectuating a conservative
agenda, Scalia-a life long, devout, and even somewhat outspoken
Catholic-would surely have decided Smith II differently. In
Smith II, Scalia reminded us that it is not for the judiciary to evaluate the merits of religious claims.3 79 It is for the individual,
through his or her legislature, to make that evaluation.38 0 Scalia
simply determined that "the Court's continued use of the compelling interest test in the free exercise context is not an appropriate
exercise of judicial power."38 He argued that the job of legislating, and of deciding difficult political issues, is best left to the legislature, not to the judiciary.382 Is this really any less protection
for the individual, or more?
In commenting on the fact that most people do not recognize
the importance of separation-of-powers in protecting liberty, Justice Scalia once said that li]t is a lot easier to get a crowd to form
behind a banner that reads 'Freedom of Speech or Death' than
behind one that reads 'Bi-cameralism or Fight.' But in point 38of3
fact,... the latter goes much more to the heart of the matter."
While bicameralism may not superficially appear to protect or
enhance the rights of individuals, it in fact does so in very fundamental ways.3 84 A separation-of-powers analysis which is defined
by the rule of law preserves individual freedom "by fostering the
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id. at 809.
See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1993).
Id.
Brant, supra note 141, at 20.

382. See id.
383. Remarks of Justice Antonin Scalia at Washington D.C. Panel Discussion
on Separation of Powers (audio tape of C-SPAN broadcast Nov. 15, 1988).

384. See Marshall, supra note 6, at 260.
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accountability, deliberation,
consensus, and moderation of govern385
ment decision makers."

Scalia may well be the Prophet of Doom, but without adherence to the text of the Constitution, and without attention to the
lines which separate the three branches, there "may be nothing
left between potential tyranny of the political branches and the
liberty of the people but a vigilant judicial branch."3 8 6 If this is
true, one can only hope that the judiciary will have the intelligence, and the good will, to remain ever vigilant. 387 The alternative is to build high walls now, guard them carefully, preserve
them for the future, and to fly the "Bi-cameralism or Fight: The
Choice of Freedom is Yours" banner from the parapets.
III. TowARDS

A NEW THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

"When the House Judiciary Committee was drafting an anti-crime
bill two weeks ago, some members suggested resolving a dispute by
putting compromise language into a committee report, which
accompanies a bill to the floor. But Barney Frank, D-Mass.,
388
warned off his colleagues with just two words: 'JusticeScalia.'

Nowhere has Justice Scalia's jurisprudential influence been
felt more keenly than in the area of statutory interpretation. 38 9
Scalia is credited with moving the academic discussion about statutory interpretation from the "Big Sleep" to the "Big Heat."390 As
with his Rule of Law and separation-of-powers jurisprudence,
Scalia began writing and lecturing about statutory interpretation
long before coming to the Court.3 9 1 After his arrival on the Court,
385.
386.
387.
388.

Werhan, supra note 141, at 2689.
See Kurland, supra note 141, at 611.
Id.
Congress Keeps Eye on Justices as Court Watches Hill's Words, 49
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 2863 (1991).
389. See Smith, supra note 140, at 59-78.
390. See, e.g., Philip Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation,77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242-245 (1992). In
his article, Professor Frickey credits Justice Scalia, along with Judge Richard
Posner and Judge Frank Easterbrook, with triggering the revival of interest in
statutory interpretation. For their early discussions on theories of statutory
interpretation see Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretationin the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 800 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Role of OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J. L. & Pus. POL'Y 59
(1988).
391. Much as he does on the Court today, while a judge on the D.C. Circuit
Scalia wrote a number of concurring and dissenting opinions in order to espouse
his theory of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1
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however, Scalia began to challenge aggressively, and
to influence,
392
the Court's approach to statutory interpretation.
While judges had engaged in debate for years about whether
statutes were plain on their face or whether legislative history
rebutted that meaning, Scalia was the first to change the terms of
the debate.39 3 In his first year on the Court, Scalia wrote a "jarring" concurring opinion in which he said,
[a]lthough it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed
approval of [using legislative history to trump plain meaning],
that is to my mind an ill-advised deviation from the venerable
principle that if the language of the statute is clear, that language
effect-at least in the absence of a patent
must be 3 given
94
absurdity

Scalia articulated his approach to interpreting statutes most

clearly two years later in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. .395

He said that:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have
been understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress;
but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with
context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been
understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the
statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always had in mind.3 96
More recently, Scalia declared "[t]he text is the law, and it is
the text that must be observed."3 97 While critics contend that
Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation has failed to win
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ; Beattie v. United States,
756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 19984) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Illinois Commerce Comm'n
v. ICC, 749 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting) cert. denied, 474 U.S.
820 (1985); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Clock, 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) rev'd 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
From fall 1985 to spring 1986, Scalia also gave a speech at various law schools
attacking the use of legislative history in interpreting statutes (copy on file with
UCLA Law Review).
392. See Karkkainen, supra note 6.
393. See id.
394. Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
395. 490 U.S. 504 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
396. Green, 490 U.S. at 528.
397. ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 22 (1997).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/2

50

19971

Fox and McAllister: An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia
AN EAGLE SOARING

273

"general acceptance on the Court,"3 9 s one need look no further
than the Court's recent statutory interpretation cases to trace the
influence of Scalia's theory. While other justices still resort to the
use of legislative history on occasion, they do so only after looking
at the text of the statute. Additionally, Scalia's influence is evidenced by the attention-now almost a cottage industry-that his
theory of statutory interpretation has received from legal
scholars.3

99

Professor William Eskridge was one of the first scholars to
write about Scalia's theory of statutory interpretation, labeling it
the "New Textualism."40 0 Professor Eskridge, predicted that if
Scalia's approach was adopted, it would "represent a significant
change in the way the Court writes its statutory interpretation
decisions, and probably even in the Court['s]... role in interpreting statutes ... ." 4o 1 Eskridge stated that "Scalia's new textualism is a . . . bold rethinking of the Court's role. "4° 2 Professor
Eskridge's "prediction" has proven correct. The Court is rethinking its role, but just as not all of the Justices agree as to what that
role should be, neither do scholars agree that Scalia's theory is the
correct one.
Justice Scalia's textualism theory of statutory interpretation
is consistent with his vision of the constitutional role that courts
should play, and with his preference for a rule of laws rather than
a law of rules.
His approach to statutory interpretation ultimately rests on his
views concerning separation of powers and notions about the rule
of law as a system of constraining rules. These views encompass a
vision of limited government ... in which an essential function of
courts is to check the tendency 40
of3the legislative branch to aggrandize itself by 'usurping' power.
Scalia made this vision clear when he said, "[itis our task, as
I see it, not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress... but
rather to give a fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the
398. Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 401.
399. The articles referenced in footnote 390, supra, are but a few of the articles
that have been written about Justice Scalia's theory of statutory interpretation.
One has only to do a brief search on Westlaw or Lexis, to find numerous articles.
400. See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 623.

401. Id. at 624.
402. Id.
403. Karkkanian, supra note 6, at 403.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997

51

274

Campbell
Law Review, LAW
Vol. 19, REVIEW
Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
CAMPBELL

[Vol. 19:223

United States Code .... 4 0 4 Indeed, part of Scalia's hostility to
the use of legislative history as an interpretive aid is that he considers reliance on items such as congressional committee reports
to be unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds.40 5 "The
greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are
governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators."40 6
His theory also is consistent with his preference for a "formalist" approach to the law. Formalists argue that judges can and
should be tightly constrained by the objective, or "plain meaning,"
of a statute. 40 7 "In a representative democracy," formalists argue,
"major policy decisions should be made by .

.

.

Congress.

Unelected judges should make as few policy choices as possible,
especially when interpreting statutes."40 8 According to formalists,
reliance on legislative history to interpret a statute distorts the
voice of Congress and violates the bi-cameralism requirement by
elevating the views of committees in one chamber over that of
Congress as a whole.4 °9
404. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
405. Recently he explained:
The legislative power is the power to make laws, not the power to make
legislators. It is nondelegable. Congress can no more authorize one
committee to "fill in the details" of a particular law in a binding fashion
than it can authorize a committee to enact minor laws. Whatever
Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the executive
or (ultimately) the judicial branch. That is the very essence of the
separation of powers.
ScALIA, supra note 397, at 35.
406. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 484 U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (Scalia, J.). In contrast to
Scalia's view that the use of legislative history threatens separation-of-powers,
Judge Patricia Wald, one of Scalia's critics states that:
To disregard committee reports as indicators of congressional
understanding because we are suspicious that nefarious staffers have
planted certain information for some undisclosed reason, is to secondguess Congress's chosen form of organization and delegation of
authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee its own constitutional
functions effectively. It comes perilously close ... to impugning the way
a coordinate branch conducts its operations and, in that sense, runs the
risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of powers
principles.
Patricia, M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39
AM. U. L. REv. 277, 306-07 (1990).
407. See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 646.
408. Id. at 648.
409. Id. at 649.
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Yet Justice Scalia's formalism is not formalism merely for its own
sake. His is a vision of governmental minimalism, resting on
strict separation of powers to preserve individual liberties by
keeping the power of each branch limited .... Moreover, for Justice Scalia, separation of powers and the rule of law are deeply
intertwined; 0a limited government must be constrained by the
rule of law.

41

So, it is in his statutory interpretation jurisprudence that the

advocate of the Rule of Law, the Prophet of Doom, and the formalist all converge. It is here that his critics must once again answer
the questions-if not plain meaning, if not the Rule of Law, if not
411
formalism, then what?
A.

Johnson v. United States
In Johnson v. United States,4

12

a 5-4 decision involving the

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Justice Scalia was joined in dis-

sent by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens,
defying (confusing?) his critics.4 13 In Johnson, the Petitioner was
the widow of a deceased Coast Guard helicopter pilot. 4 14 The

deceased, Lieutenant Commander Horton Johnson, was killed in
a helicopter crash while responding to a distress call from a
boat.4 1 5 Petitioner brought a wrongful death action against the
410. See Karkainen, supra note 6, at 427.
411. This article does not propose to analyze, at length, Justice Scalia's theory
of statutory interpretation. Instead, in keeping with the thesis of the article, the
focus is on whether Justice Scalia applies this theory consistently and whether it
has, in fact, influenced the Court. For a fuller discussion of Justice Scalia's
theory on statutory interpretation, the following articles are excellent. Read in
order, they give a chronology of the evolution and the influence of Justice Scalia's
theory. See, e.g., William K, Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 U.C.LA. L. REV.
621 (1990); Nicholas Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of
Statutes: Towards a Fact Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1295 (1990); Phillip Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revivial of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MIN. L. REv. 241 (1992); W.
David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Stattory Interpretation
Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383 (1992); Bradly C. Karkkainen,
"Plain Meaning:" Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory
Construction, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (1994); Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and
Allure of Textualsim, 40 ViLL. L. REV. 93 (1995).
412. 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
413. Id.
414. Id. at 683.
415. Id.
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United States under the FTCA. 1 6 In her complaint, Petitioner
sought damages from the United States on the grounds that the
civilian FAA flight controllers negligently caused her husband's
death.4 17
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that
Petitioner's claim was barred because the deceased was killed
during the course of his military duties. 418 The district court
agreed and dismissed the complaint relying exclusively on the
Supreme Court's decision in Feres v. United States.419 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the Government has no FTCA
liability for injuries to members of the military arising out of or in
the course of activity incident to service.420
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 421 The court noted

that although the language of Feres precludes suits by service
members against the government when the negligence alleged is
on the part of another service member, when the negligence
alleged is on the part of a non-service member, Feres does not bar
the suit. 4 2 2 Thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit granted the Government's request for a rehearing en banc and upheld the panel's
decision.4 23 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to "review the
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to
resolve the conflict among the circuits."' 24
1.

The Majority and The Broad Purposes of the FTCA

The majority began its analysis by reiterating that Feres does
not allow service members to bring suits under the FTCA, and
that this rule has remained unchanged by Congress or case law
for over 40 years.425 Further, the Court stated that contrary to
Petitioner's arguments, the military status of the alleged
tortfeasor has never been held to be crucial to the application of
the doctrine. 2 6 The Court refused to modify the doctrine to
416. Id. The Federal Torts Claims Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 26712680.
417. Id.
418. Id.

419. Id.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

See id.
Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1539.
177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949) (en banc).
Johnson v. United States, 479 U.S. 811 (1986).
Johnson v. United States, 481 U.S. 681, 686 (1987).
Id. at 687.
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exclude suits where the alleged tortfeasor was a civilian rather
42 7
than a member of the military.

The Court then reviewed the three broad rationales underlying the Feres decision, which are:
(1) [tlhe relationship between the government and the members
of the armed forces is 'distinctively federal in character.'
(2) [tlhe existence of... generous statutory disability and death
benefits [to members of the military] is an independent reason
why the Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injury.
(3) Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by service
members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to
service are barred ... because they are the 'types of claims that...

would involve the judiciary in sensitive military
affairs at the
4 28
expense of military discipline and effectiveness.'
As to the first purpose, the Court found that "[w]here a service member is injured incident to service... it 'makes no sense to
permit fortuity of situs of the alleged negligence to affect the liability of the Government . ..
429As to the second purpose, the
Court found that not only do those injured incident to service
receive benefits that "'compare extremely favorably with those
provided by most workmen's compensation statutes,'" but the
recovery of those benefits is swift, efficient, and generally requires
no litigation. 430 Finally, as to the third purpose, the Court found
that even where military negligence is not specifically alleged in a
tort action, "a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily
implicates military judgments and decisions .that are inextricably
"4 3 1
intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.
Applying this analysis to the case before it, the Court found
that the decedent was killed incident to his military service and
that his suit was therefore barred.432 Additionally, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Feres and held that the doctrine was applicable to all injuries incident to service in the military, regardless of
whether the tortfeasor is a member of the military or not.433
".

427. Id. at 687-88.
428. Id. at 689-91.
429. Id. at 689. (quoting Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431
U.S. 666, 672 (1977)).
430. Id. at 690. (quoting Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673).
431. Id. at 691.
432. Id. at 692.
433. See id.
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2. On Incorrect Reading of Text & Strange Bed Fellows
In dissent Scalia turned first, as always, to the text of the
statute. He began by saying that although the majority provided
several reasons why Congress might have been wise to exempt
certain claims from the FTCA, "[t]he problem now, as then, is that
Congress not only failed to provide such an exemption, but quite
plainly excluded it." 4 3 4 Lamenting that the Respondent did not

ask the Court to overturn Feres, Scalia, along with Justices Bren43 5
nan, Marshall, and Stevens, nonetheless refused to extend it.

The pertinent portion of the FTCA renders the Government
liable:
[Flor money damages... for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstance where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.436
Scalia explained that "[r]ead as it is written," the language of
the statute "renders the United States liable to all persons, including servicemen, injured by the negligence of Government employees."4 37 Scalia argued that although there are a number of
exceptions set forth in the FTCA, none generally precludes suits
brought by servicemen.4 38 In fact, Scalia pointed out, one exception excludes "'[any claim arising out of the combatant activities
of the military ... diring time of war,' demonstrating that Congress specifically considered ...
military."

4 39

the special requirements of the

Scalia also argued that in the first FTCA case brought by a
serviceman, the Court gave effect to the plain meaning of the statute.44 In Brooks v. United States,44 1 the Court rejected the Government's argument that those injured while enlisted in the
military could never recover under the FTCA. 4 42 The Court held
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 693. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)).
Id.
337 U.S. 49 (1949).
Id.
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that the FTCA gives jurisdiction "over any claim founded on negligence brought against the United States," and that the exceptions
to the Act did not "permit an inference that... Congress intended
to bar all suits brought by servicemen." 4 48 The Court found that
the plaintiffs in Brooks could recover under the FTCA, but in
dicta, the Court cautioned that an attempt by a serviceman to
recover for injuries suffered "incident to... service" would present
a "wholly different case." 4
This "wholly different case" reached the Court one year later
in Feres. The Court gave three reasons for holding that injuries
arising out of or in the course of activity incident to service were
barred, they were:
[T]he parallel private liability required by the FTCA was absent;
(2) Congress could not have intended that local tort law govern
the 'distinctively federal' relationship between the Government
and enlisted personnel; and (3) Congress could not have intended
to make FTCA suits available to servicemen who have already
benefits . . . for injuries suffered incident to
received" veterans'
5
service. "
Several years after Feres, the Court thought of a fourth
rationale: "Congress could not have indented to permit suits for
service-related injuries because they would unduly interfere with
military discipline." 4
Scalia rejected all of these rationales. 4 7 He stated that only
the first rationale purports to be textually based and because no
"private individual" can raise an Army and no State has consented to suit by members of its militia, § 2674 shields the government from liability."' Scalia argued that under this reasoning,
"many of the Act's exceptions are superfluous, since private individuals typically do not, for example, transmit postal matter,...
collect taxes,... impose quarantines,... or regulate the monetary
system."44 9 In any event, Scalia argued, the Court subsequently
recognized and rejected the error of this rationale.45 ° Scalia
stated that in spite of the fact that the Court had rejected this
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

448.
449.
450.
(1957)

Id. at 51.
Id. at 52.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-45 (1950).
See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 694 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 694-95 (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319
and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 61-69 (1955)).
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"textual" reading, "the Feres rule is now sustained... by three
disembodied estimations 4of
what Congress must (despite what it
51
enacted) have intended."

As to the second rationale, Scalia stated that "[t]he unfairness
to servicemen of geographically varied recovery is, to speak
bluntly, an absurd justification, given that, as we have pointed out
in another context, nonuniform recovery cannot possibly be worse
than uniform nonrecovery." 452 As to the rationale resting upon
the military's need for uniformity, Scalia argued that "it is difficult
to explain why uniformity... is indispensable for the military, but
not for the may other federal departments and agencies that can
be sued under the FTCA .... 43 Scalia concluded that regardless
of how it is understood, "the second Feres rationale is not a plausible estimation of congressional intent, much less a justification for
importing that estimation, unwritten, into the statute."454
As to the third rationale, Scalia pointed out that it too had
been denominated "no longer controlling" by the Court.455 Scalia
argued that it is only in dicta that the Court has characterized
recovery under the Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA) as the sole remedy for service-related injuries.456 Additionally, Scalia argued
that "[t]he credibility of this rationale is undermined severely by
the fact that both before and after Feres we permitted injured servicemen to bring FTCA suits, even though they had been compensated under the VBA." 4 5 7 Citing Brooks v. United States458 and
United States v. Brown 45 9 as support, Scalia concluded that "the

presence of an alternative compensation system neither explains
nor justifies the Feres doctrine; it only makes the effect of the doctrine more palatable."46 °

451. Id. at 695.
452. Id. at 695-96.
453. Id. at 696.
454. Id. at 696-97.
455. Id. at 697 (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58, n.4 (1985)).
456. Id. (citing Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 464
(1980) (per curiam)).
457. Id. (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 (1949)).
458. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
459. 381 U.S. 437, 111 (1965).
460. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 698 (citing Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580. 598
(U.S. App. D.C. 1980)).
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As to the fourth rationale, Scalia said that "[t]he foregoing
three rationales-the only ones actually relied upon in Feres-are
so frail that it is hardly surprising that we have repeatedly cited
the later-conceived-of 'military discipline' rationale as the 'best'
explanation for that decision."46 Scalia conceded that if the statute in question were vague he would take into account the possibility that some suits brought by servicemen would adversely
affect military discipline.4" 2 But, he argued, "I do not think the
effect upon military discipline is so certain... that we are justified
in holding (if we can ever be justified in holding) that Congress did
not mean what it plainly said in the statute before us." 4 63 Scalia

also argued that it was strange that Congress' "obvious" intent to
preclude Feres suits because of their potential effect on military
service was "discerned neither by the Feres Court nor by the Congress that enacted the FTCA ....
Scalia stated that to the extent that the reading of the FTCA
would require civilian courts to examine military decision making
and thus influence discipline, "it is outlandish to consider that
result "outlandish"

. . .

since in fact it occurs frequently even

under the Feres dispensation."46 5 For example, Scalia argued, if
Lieutenant Commander Johnson's helicopter had crashed into a
civilian's home, the homeowner could have brought suit under the
FTCA thus requiring the court to examine military decision making no less than it would in the present case.466 After all, Scalia
pointed out, "the morale of Lieutenant Commander Johnson's
comrades-in-arms will not likely be boosted by the news that his
widow and children will receive only a fraction of the amount they
might have recovered had he been piloting a commercial helicopter at the time of his death."46 7 Scalia concluded that none of the
four rationales justified the Court's failure to apply the FTCA as
written.468
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 700.
Id.

468. Id.
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4.

On Finding Beauty in What the Court Wrought
Finally, Scalia criticized the Feres Court's claim that its decision was necessary to make "the entire statutory system of remedies against the Government a workable, consistent, and
equitable whole."469 Pointing out the many inconsistencies that
have resulted from Feres, Scalia argued that "bringing harmony to
the law has hardly been the consequence of our ignoring what
470
Congress wrote and imagining what it should have written."
Scalia stated that he could find no comfort from Congress' failure
to amend the FTCA to overturn Feres, as the "unlegislated desires

of later Congresses with regard to one thread in the fabric of the
FTCA could hardly have any bearing upon the proper interpretation of the entire fabric of compromises that their predecessors
enacted into law in 1946. "471
Finding no beauty in the Court's decision, Scalia concluded
that:
Had Lieutenant Commander Johnson been piloting a commercial
helicopter when he crashed into the side of a mountain, his widow
and children could have sued and recovered for their loss. But
because Johnson devoted his life to serving in his country's Armed
Forces, the Court today limits his family to a fraction of what they
might otherwise have received. If our imposition bore the legitimacy of having been prescribed by the people's elected representatives, it would (insofar as we are permitted to inquire into such
things) be just. But it has not been, and it is not.4 72
Scalia found no beauty in the Court's decision because it
ignored the plain meaning of the statute. He found no beauty,
because one thread that consistently runs through the fabric of
Scalia's opinions is his reliance on the text, no matter that it occasionally results in his having strange bed fellows.
B. Blanchard v. Bergeron
In Blanchardv. Bergeron,473 Petitioner brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Respondent, a sheriffs deputy, had
beaten him and thereby deprived him of his civil rights.4 7 4 The
case was tried before a jury, and Petitioner was awarded $5,000 in
469. See id. at 701.

470. Id. at 702.
471. Id. at 702-03.
472. Id. at 703.
473. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
474. Id. at 88-89.
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compensatory damages and $5000 in punitive damages on his
§ 1983 claim.4 75 Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which
permits the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in certain civil rights actions, Petitioner also sought attorney's fees and
costs totaling more than $40,000.476 The district court awarded
$7500 in attorney's fees and $886.92 for costs and expenses.4 7 7
Petitioner appealed the award of attorney's fees to the Fifth
Circuit, seeking to increase the award.4 78 The Fifth Circuit, however, reduced the award because it found that Petitioner had
entered into a contingency-fee agreement with his attorney, the
terms of which dictated that the attorney was to receive 40% of
any damages awarded to Petitioner. 4 79 The court relied on its
prior decisions and ruled that contingency-fee agreements serve
as a cap on the amount of attorney's fees that can be awarded.4 8 °
Additionally, the court found that hours billed for the time of law
clerks and paralegals was not compensable since they would be
included within the contingency fee. 4 81 Accordingly, the court limited the fee award to 40% of the $10,000 damages award, and held
that Plaintiff could recover no additional "attorneys fees."4 8 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.4 8 3
1.

The Johnson Factors

In beginning its analysis, the Court, oddly enough, looked
first to the text of the statute. Section 1988 allows for reasonable
attorney's fees in the event that a party prevails, but does not
define a "reasonable" fee. 48 4 The Court also looked to the legislative history of the statute and found that "[in computing the fee,
counsel for prevailing parties should be paid. .. 'for all time rea48 5
sonably expended on the matter.'"
After considering the legislative history, the Court then
looked at the case of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. ,486
475.
476.
477.
478.

Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 90.

479. Id.
480.
481.
482.
483.

Blanchard v. Bergeron, 831 F.2d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id.
Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 90.
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 487 U.S. 1217 (1988).

484. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
485. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976)).

486. 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974).
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a case that was decided prior to the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,the Court cited with approval the factors
set forth in Johnson for determining attorney's fees.48 7 The Court
stated that the Johnson factors provided guidance as to Congress'
intent because both the House and Senate reports refer to the
twelve Johnson factors 4 8 for assessing the reasonableness of
attorney's fees.489
Based on these factors and three district court decisions
pointed to in the statute's legislative history, the Court found that
the contingency-fee factor "is simply that, a factor."490 While the
presence of a contingency-fee agreement might aid in determining
the reasonableness of fees, the Court found that such an agreement "does not impose an automatic ceiling on an award of attorney's fees, and to hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the
statute and its policy and purpose." Additionally, the Court stated
that a plaintiff's recovery will not be reduced by what he must pay
491
his attorney.

Finally, the Court reiterated that an initial assessment of
attorney's fees is made by applying the "Lodestar Formula," that
is, by multiplying the prevailing billable rate by the hours reasonably expended on the claim. 4 9 2 Then, courts may adjust the fee
upwards or downwards in accordance with the Johnson factors. 4 93
The Court stated that it is clear that Congress intended the
amount of fees awarded in civil rights actions to be determined by
the same standards that are applied in other actions. 4 94 This

intent, the Court stated, is consistent with the purpose of § 1988,
487. 461 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1983).
488. The twelve Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the

novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal
service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to

acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship; (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson,

489 F.2d at 717-19.
489. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 94 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)).
493. Id.
494. Id. at 95.
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which ensures "effective access
to the judicial process for persons
49 5

with civil rights grievances."
Additionally, the Court found that § 1988 makes no distinction between actions for damages and actions for equitable
relief.4 9 6 The Court concluded that a contingent-fee agreement is
inappropriate for the determination of fees under § 1988 and that
"the attorneys fees provided for in a contingent-fee agreement is
not a ceiling upon fees recoverable under § 1988."4 9 ' The Court
declined to answer whether legal assistants' fees should be
included in the award.4 98
2.

The UnrestrainedUse of Legislative History

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment of the Court except
for that portion which relied upon the Fifth Circuit's analysis of
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. and on the three district court decisions mentioned in the FTCA's legislative history.4 9 9 Scalia stated that the Court resolved the fact that
Johnson contradicts the three district court opinions by "concluding in effect that the analysis in Johnson is dictum, whereas in the
50 0
three District Court opinions it was a holding."
Scalia argued that:
Congress did no such thing. Congress is elected to enact statutes
rather than to point to cases, and its Members have better uses for
their time than poring over District Court opinions. That the
Court should refer to the citation of the three District Court cases
in a document issued by single committee of a single house as the
action of Congress displays the level of unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative history has attained.50 1
Further, Scalia stated that he was confident that only a small
number of the Members of Congress even read the Committee
Reports, and "that very few of those who did set off for the nearest
law library to check out what was actually said in the four cases at
issue."5 o2
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)).
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

500. Id. at 98.
501. Id.
502. Id.
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On Modern Day Drafting, Consistency, and Faithfulness

Having attacked the Court's use of legislative history, Scalia
went even further when he declared that:
[Alnyone familiar with modem-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware [that] the references to cases were
inserted at best by a committee staff member on his or her own
initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist .... What a heady feeling it must be
for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land,
thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.50 3
Scalia concluded by saying that he declined to participate in
this process of turning obscure legislative history into law. 50 4 He
argued that it is neither compatible with the Court's judicial
responsibility to apply statutes effectively, or to congressional
intent, to give "legislative force to each snippet of analysis... in
committee reports that are increasingly unreliable evidence of
50 5
what the voting Members of Congress actually had in mind.
Recognizing that the Court had, however, utilized his theory
of statutory analysis to a large degree, Scalia closed by saying that
"[e]xcept for a few passages... today's opinion admirably follows
our more recent approach of seeking to develop an interpretation
of statute that is reasonable, consistent, and faithful to its ...
purpose, rather than to achieve obedient adherence to cases cited
in committee reports. I therefore join the balance of the opinion."5 0 6 Even with this victory of sorts, Scalia recognized that his
job was not finished.
C. Smith v. United States
An excellent example of the complexity and depth of Scalia's
textualism is Smith v. United States, 50 7 in which he was joined in
dissent by Justices Stevens and Souter. 50 8 Petitioner John Smith
was convicted of knowingly "using" a MAC-10 machine-gun with a
silencer during and in relation to the sale of cocaine.50 9 Under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) a defendant who uses a firearm in this manner
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 99-100.
508 U.S. 223 (1993).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.
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must be sentenced to five years in prison. And where the firearm
is a "machine-gun," or is fitted with a silencer, the sentence is 30
years. 1 ° Petitioner attempted to trade his MAC-10 for drugs in a
sale to an undercover police officer. 5 1 1 This "trade" was defined as
a "use" for purposes of the sentencing enhancement, and Petitioner was sentenced to 30 years in prison.5 1 2
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Petitioner argued that
§ 924(c)(1)'s penalty for the use of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense covers only those situations in which the firearm is
used as a weapon.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Petitioner's
argument and held that the plain language of the statute imposes
no requirement that the firearm be used as a weapon. 5 1 4 Instead,
the court explained, any use of the weapon to facilitate the commission of the offense suffices.51 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits as to the
appropriate meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
1.

On Borrowing A

Trick From Scalia's Statutory

InterpretationBag
The Court started its analysis by resorting to one of Justice
Scalia's favorite sources for statutory interpretation, the dictionary.5 16 The Court, again borrowing from Scalia's method of interpretation, stated that when a word is not defined by statute, the
words are defined in keeping with their ordinary meaning. 7
Using Webster's dictionary, the Court defined "use," to mean "to
51 8
use" or "to convert to one's service" or "to employ."
The Court then applied this definition to the two-part test
required by the statute. In order for the additional penalties to be
imposed, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant
"used or carried a firearm," and that the use or carrying was "during and in relation to" a crime of violence or drug trafficking.5 1 9
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.

18 U.S.C. § 924(cX1).
Smith, 508 U.S. at 225-26.
See id. at 227.
Smith v. United States, 957 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 837.
Id.
Smith, 508 U.S. at 228-29.
Id. at 228.
518. Id. at 228-29 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2806 (2d ed. 1949) and BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY 1541 (6th
ed. 1991)).
519. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
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The Court found that Petitioner's handling of the MAC-10 fell
"squarely within those definitions. By attempting to trade his
MAC-10 for drugs, he 'used' or 'employed' it as an item of barter to
obtain cocaine." 520 Additionally, the Court rejected Petitioner's

argument that § 924(c)(1) should require proof that the firearm
was used as a weapon.5 21 Instead, the Court stated that the broad
sweep of the statute's language punishes any "use" of a firearm so
long as that use is during, and in relation to, a drug trafficking
offense.522
Perhaps anticipating Justice Scalia's criticism, the Court conceded that language cannot be interpreted apart from its context.523 The Court stated that "[t]he meaning of a word that
appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear when
52 4
the word is analyzed in light of the terms that surround it."

Applying this analysis to Petitioner's "use" of a gun, the Court
stated that it was both reasonable and normal to say that Petitioner "used" his MAC-10 when he traded it for cocaine.52 5
Responding to the dissent, the Court rejected the argument
that a cane, for example, is normally used to aid in walking.5 26
The Court pointed out that "[t]he most infamous use of a cane in
American history had nothing to do with walking... the use of a
cane as an instrument of punishment was once so common that 'to
cane'... [became] a verb meaning '[t]o beat with a cane.'" 527 Likewise, the Court rejected the dissent's reliance on the United
States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual 528 as "reflecting its interpretation of the phrase 'uses... a firearm.'" 529 On the
contrary, the Court found it "perfectly reasonable" to construe
§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) to include uses such as trading and
bludgeoning.530
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 230.
Id.
Id. at 230-31. (citing

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY Of THE

(2d ed. 1949)).

528. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1992).

529. Smith, 508 U.S. at 231.
530. Id. at 232.
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2. Back to the Text
After determining that the Petitioner's actions comported
with the normal definition of the word "use," the Court went back
to the text of the statute for further support. 53 ' The Court stated
that to the extent that there is uncertainty about the scope of the
phrase "uses .

.

. a firearm," the remainder of § 924 "sets it to

rest."5 3 2 The Court found that Congress had also "employed"5 3
the words "use" and "firearm" together in § 924(d)(1), which deals
with forfeiture of firearms.5 3 4 Specifically, the section states that
any firearm intended to be "used" in an interstate trade is prohibited and is subject to forfeiture.535 Thus, the Court concluded that
anyone who trades a firearm "uses" it within the meaning of

§ 924(d)(1).

5 36

Finally, the Court rejected the dissent's argument that its
interpretation created a "strange dichotomy" between "using" a
firearm and "carrying" one. 5 37 The Court responded that "[t]he
dichotomy arises, if at all, only when one tries to extend the
phrase 'uses . . . a firearm' to any use for any purpose whatso-

ever."538 Likewise, the Court rejected the dissent's argument that
§ 924(c)(1) originally dealt with the use of firearms during crimes
of violence. 53 9 The Court stated that even if Congress had

intended the statute to have a more limited scope in its original
version, "we believe it clear from the face of the statute that the
Congress that amended § 924(c)(1) in 1986 did not."540 Accordingly, the Court found that using a firearm in a guns-for-drugs
trade may constitute
using a firearm within the meaning of
1

§ 924(c)(1). 5

4

531. Id. at 233.
532. Id.
533. Note that the Court was careful not to utilize the word "use" in this
sentence. Instead, it substituted the word "employ," being careful not to "use"
the word "use" in a manner that would be consistent with its ordinary usage.
534. Id. at 233-34.
535. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3)(C) and (F)).
536. Id. at 234-35.
537. Id. at 236.
538. Id.

539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 237.
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Back to the Dictionary

The Court went on to analyze whether Petitioner's "use" of
the MAC-10 was "in relation to" his drug trafficking offense.5 4 2
Once again, the Court turned to Webster's and stated that "in
relation to" means "with reference" or " was regards." 43 The
Court concluded, however, that it did not need to determine the
precise meaning of "in relation to," "as petitioner's use of his MAC10 meets any reasonable construction of it." 5"4
Finally, the Court rejected Petitioner's reliance on United
States v. Phelps,5 4 5 a case in which the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a gun was not used or carried "in relation
to" a drug trafficking offense when it was used as an item of barter
and not as a weapon.5 46 The Court stated that a gun, even when it
is used as an item of barter, can suddenly transform itself into a
weapon, thus justifying a broad interpretation of the phrase.5 4 7
The Court used this same argument in rejecting the dissent's
invocation of the rule of lenity.5 4 s The Court stated that the rule
of lenity cannot dictate an impossible interpretation of a statute,
and that there is no reason why "Congress would have intended
courts. . . applying § 924(c)(1) to draw a fine metaphysical distinction between a gun's role in a drug offense.., and its role as
an item of barter ....
The Court therefore held that a criminal who trades his firearm for drugs "uses" it during and "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense. 5 50 The Court upheld Petitioner's 30-year mandatory
sentence. 5 5 1
4.

On Ordinary Usage & Prying Open Cash Registers

Because the majority had usurped his usual starting place,
Scalia did not begin his analysis with the text of the statute.
Instead, he began with the fundamental principle of statutory
542. Id.

543. Id. at 237-38
ENGLISH LANGUAGE

544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.

(citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE

2102 (2d ed. 1945)).

Id. at 238.
895 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1990).
Smith, 508 U.S. at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id.
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interpretation that the meaning of a word cannot be determined
in isolation, but must be defined from the context in which it is
used.552 Scalia argued that this was "especially true of a word as
elastic as 'use,' whose meanings range all the way from 'to partake
of' . . . to 'to be wont or accustomed.' 55 3 Additionally, Scalia
reminded the Court that when searching for statutory meaning,
554
courts must give nontechnical words their ordinary meaning.
Scalia went on to analyze the phrase "to use" in the context of
these principles. He said that to use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose and that when "someone asks 'Do you use a cane?,' he is not inquiring whether you
have your grandfather's silver handled walking-stick on display in
the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with a cane.
Similarly argued Scalia, when someone asks if you "used" a gun in
the course of a crime, they are not asking whether you traded a
gun for drugs.556 He argued that "the Court does not appear to
grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and how it
is ordinarily used .... It would, indeed, be reasonable and normal
to say that petitioner 'used' his MAC-10 in his drug trafficking
offense. It would also be reasonable and normal to say that he
"used" it to scratch his head."5 7
Scalia goes on to argue that the normal meaning of the phrase
"to use" is reflected in the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
which provides for sentence enhancements when firearms are
"brandished," "discharged," "possessed," or "otherwise used."5 5 8 In
a footnote, Scalia demonstrated the absurdity that could result
from the Court's interpretation.
Reading the Guidelines as they are written.

.

., and interpreting

'use of a firearm' in the strange fashion the Court does, produces,
...

a full seven-point upward sentence adjustment for firing a gun

at a storekeeper during a robbery; a mere five-point adjustment
for pointing the gun at the storekeeper ...

but an intermediate

552. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

553. Id. at 241-42 (quoting WEBSTER'S
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2806

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE

(2d ed. 1939)).

554. Id. at 242.

555. Id.
556. See id.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 243 (quoting United States Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual
§ 2B3.1(b)(2) (Nov. 1992)).
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six-point adjustment for using the gun to pry open the cash register or prop open the door.55 9
Scalia argued that such an outcome is quite ridiculous, and
that it is inconsequential that the words "as a weapon" do not follow "to use a firearm," because they are "reasonably implicit."5 60
5.

On Stretching Language to Fit

After concluding that "to use" should be defined by its ordinary and reasonable meaning, Scalia criticized the Court for seeking to avoid § 924(d) of the statute, which does not employ the
phrase "uses a firearm."5 6 1 Instead, it provides for the confiscation of firearms that are "used in" certain crimes, including the
crimes of transferring, selling, or transporting firearms in interstate commerce. 56 2 The Court concluded that whenever the
phrase appears in the statute, "use" of a firearm must include
nonweapon use.5 6 3

Scalia disagreed. He argued that "[w]e are

dealing here not with a technical word or an 'artfully defined' legal
term,... but with common words that are ... inordinately sensitive to context."5 6 4 Therefore, Scalia concluded, just as every
appearance of "use" in the statute does not have to be given narrow meaning, neither does the appearance of "use a firearm" have
to be defined to mean "use a firearm in crimes such as unlawful
sale of firearms."5 6 5
Scalia also considered the "dichotomy" which § 924(c)(1)
would cause by providing for increased penalties not only for
someone who "uses" a firearm, but for someone who "carries" a
firearm in relation to a crime.5 6 6 He argued that the interpretation that he would give the language produces "an eminently reasonably dichotomy between 'using a firearm' . . . and 'carrying a
firearm.' The Court's interpretation, by contrast, produces a
strange dichotomy between 'using a firearm for any purpose
whatever, including barter,' and 'carrying a firearm.'" Scalia
rejected the Court's response to this argument, saying that:
559. Id.
560. See id. at 244.
561. Id.

562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 244-45.
565. Id. at 245.
566. Id.
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The Court responds to this argument by abandoning all pretense
of giving the phrase 'uses a firearm' even a permissible meaning,
much less its ordinary one. There is no problem, the Court says,
because it is not contending that 'uses a firearm' means 'uses for
any purpose,' only that it means 'uses as a weapon for trade.'
Unfortunately, this is not one of the options our mother-tongue
makes available. 'Uses a firearm' can be given broad meaning...
or its more ordinary narrow meaning... ; but it can not possibly
mean 'uses as a weapon for trade.'56 7
Finally, Scalia stated that it was significant that Petitioner
was prosecuted under that portion of § 924(c)(1) pertaining to us
of a firearm "during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking
offense."5 6 8 Scalia explained that this was significant because
that portion of the statute is affiliated with the pre-existing provision pertaining to the use of a firearm "during and in relation to
any crime of violence," rather than with those firearm-trafficking
offense listed in § 922.569 Scalia argued that the word "'use' in the
'crime of violence' context has the unmistakable import of use as a
weapon and that import carries over . . . to the subsequently
added phrase 'or drug trafficking crime.'" 5 70 Further, Scalia
argued that even if the issue is not as clear as he thinks it is, it is
at least debatable-thereby requiring the Court to apply the rule
5 71
of lenity and find for the Petitioner.
Scalia concluded by rejecting the Court's argument that giving the language its ordinary meaning would frustrate the purpose of the statute.5 7 2 Scalia, a textualist to the end, warned the
Court that "[s]tretching language in order to write a more effective
statute than Congress devised is not an exercise we should

5
indulge in."

D.

73

On Changing the Rules of the Game

Whether for good or bad, Justice Scalia has changed the rules
of the statutory interpretation game.5 7 4 He has changed them, if
not entirely, then to a substantial degree. The Court's reliance
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.

Id. at 246, n.3.
Id. at 246 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at n.4.
Id. at n.4.
See Smith, supra note 140, at 38.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997

71

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2

294

CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 19:223

upon legislative history has declined significantly.5 75 If nothing
else, Justice Scalia has reminded the Court that statutory inter5 76
pretation is, first and foremost, an exercise in textual analysis.
And, he has reminded the Justices that it is the Court, and the
Court alone, that "has the power to change the federal system
back to the theory of law as statute, because it alone has the
power to set the rules for when and how legislative history may be
used."5 7 7
According to Justice Scalia's rules of the game, legislative history may be used only when the plain text of the statute, if applied
literally, would create an absurd result. 578 Scalia replaces legislative history with dictionary definitions and interpretive canons,
which critics argue are no less immune from manipulation
because it is unlikely that all judges will agree on a single mean57 9
ing of the text, and that every canon has a counter-canon.
Additionally, they argue that textualism, like legislative history,
"gives courts a neutral-looking way to conceal real policy choices
....

"580

Resort to legislative history, for example, "permits judges

to claim that their own policy preferences are really the unexpressed will of Congress. Textualism serves much the same function, only it replaces the fiction of Congressional intent with...
fictions about the ... meaning of the language."581
There is no basis in Justice Scalia's opinions, however, to support this view.58 2 Justice Scalia, contrary to this criticism, is not a
"pure" textualist or strict constructionist.58 3 Rather, he urges a
575. See Eskridge, supra note 400, at 657. In his article, Professor Eskrdige
demonstrates, through the use of statistics, that even as early as 1988, the
Court's use of legislative history had decreased. In 1986, the Court used
legislative history to confirm plain meaning 18 times, in 1988 they did so only 11

times. Additionally, in 1986 the Court used legislative history to get around
apparent meaning 7 times, it did so only 4 times in 1988. Id.
576. See id. at 690.
577. See Slawson, supra note 411, at 424.
578. See Polich, supra note 6, at 270.
I acknowledge an interpretative doctrine of what the old writers call lapsus
linguae (slip of the tongue), and what our modern cases call "scrivener's error,"
where on the very face of the statute it is clear to the reader that a mistake of
expression (rather than of legislative wisdom) has been made.
Scalia, supra note 399, at 20.
579. See id. at 274-76.
580. Id. at 288.
581. Id.
582. See Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 406.
583. Id.
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common-sensical textualism that takes into account context and
ordinary typical meaning but which avoids slavish attention to
individual words or the pursuit of hypertechnical deconstructive
methods. For instance, Justice Scalia believes, as do many, that
statutes can be understood only in context.58 4 Additionally, Scalia
looks at the purpose of the statute to interpret the meaning of the
text, but insists that this interpretation remain consistent with
the text itself.5

5

He warns that "[tihe principle of our democratic

system is not that each legislature enacts a purpose, independent
of the language of the statute, which the courts must then perpetuate, assuring that it is fully achieved but never overshot by
expanding or ignoring the statutory language as changing circumstances require."5 se
Ultimately, "Justice Scalia's antipathy toward legislative history probably has less to do with its evidentiary value than its
consequences for how law is made. Judicial reliance on legislative
history, in his view, allows Congress to write and courts to effectuate vague, ambiguous, broadly drawn, and far-reaching statutes."5 8 7 While Justice Scalia's choice of statutory rules still
involves judicial discretion, at a minimum his choices mean that
Congress must be fairly explicit, and that courts must begin their
analysis with the text of the statute. And Justice Scalia recognizes that his textualism is not fail-safe:
I concede, of course, that textualism is no ironclad protection
against the judge who wishes to impose his will, but it is some
protection. The criterion of "legislative intent," by contrast, positively invites the judge to impose his will; by setting him off in
search of what does not exist (there is almost never any genuine
legislative intent on the narrow point at issue), it reduces him to
guessing that the legislature intended what was most reasonable,
which ordinarily coincides with what the judge himself thinks
nontextual methodologies are similarly wishbest. Other
58 8
fulfilling.
According to Scalia, by utilizing textualism and pursuing the
rule of law as the basis for deciding cases he not only constrains
lower courts but, at a minimum, he constrains himself. "If the next
584. Id.
585. Id. at 412.
586. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
587. See Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 424. See also Scalia's quote at text
accompanying note 404, supra.
588. SCALL4, supra, note 397, at 132.
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case should have such different facts that my political or policy
preferences regarding the outcome are quite the opposite, I will be
unable to indulge those preferences .... Only by announcing rules
do we hedge ourselves in."58 9 At a minimum, it is a good place to
start.

IV. THE "REAL WORLD" AND THOSE WHO WOULD SOAR
While Scalia's principles may be seductive in their logic and
clarity, are they realistic and workable? Among the many criticisms directed at Scalia, the most frequent is that rigid adherence
to rules is unworkable in the real world in which lawyers and
judges practice and people live and work. Are Justice Scalia's
rules, however, any more unworkable than the balancing tests
and case-by-case analyses which Scalia's critics generally advocate? Or, are his principles a better place to start because at a
minimum they offer an identifiable beginning point, definable
rules for judges to apply, and concrete principles to guide them?
While there is no shortage of people who criticize Scalia, there
are few-if any-who are willing to set aside their own ideologies
long enough to analyze Scalia's jurisprudence objectively, critically
and honestly. Indeed, there are several among Scalia's critics who
speak loudly, many who speak often, and some who simply speak,
but few, if any, who truly soar.
Laurence Tribe and A Living Constitution
When Professor Laurence Tribe speaks, many people listen.
As a well known and respected professor of constitutional law,
Tribe appeals to a wide audience. He is known not only for his
academic work, but for his skills as a Supreme Court litigator. He
can often be found arguing before the Supreme Court, defending
the rights of individuals and advocating for a living or "evolving"

A.

589. See Scalia, supra note 8, at 1179.
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constitution.5 9 ° It is this notion of an evolving constitution which
brings him into conflict with the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia.59 1
1.

The Rule of Love as the Rule of Law

Tribe pays lip service to the Rule of Law.5 9 2 He and Scalia
part paths, however, in defining the Rule of Law and how it
should be applied. 59 3 Tribe has criticized Scalia's Rule of Law as
being "an ideal of exalted formalism under which regularity and
predictability and closure count for more than substantive jus-

tice."5 94 While agreeing that the Rule of Law is a "vital baseline"
for legal analysis, Tribe's Rule of Law-unlike Scalia's-has mem59 5
ory, soul, compassion, sympathy, a heart, and peripheral vision.

In fact, Tribe's Rule of Law has "no ultimate conflict with the Rule
596
of Love."
Where Scalia's Rule of Law provides for general rules that
limit the discretion of judges, Tribe's Rule of Law would incorporate judges' "common knowledge about the facts of life." 5 97 Tribe

asserts that "we make a grievous mistake when we equate the
Rule of Law with the narrowest... most unfeeling and unseeing
versions of the Ideal of Law." 5 98 As an example of the Rule of Love
as the Rule of Law, Tribe points to the Supreme Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education.5
590. In the past Term, Professor Tribe argued three cases before the Supreme
Court. Most notably, he argued Quill v Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996), which presented the Court with the question
whether a legally competent person has a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide. (The answer is "No." See Vacco v. Quill, 65 U.S.L.W. 4695, 1997
WL 348037 (1997)). On this issue, Justice Scalia was criticized for making extrajudicial remarks last year about his belief that no such "right" exists under the
Constitution.
591. In remarks to the student body of the University of Kansas School of Law
on October 3, 1996, Scalia said that while many advocate a living constitution, he
advocates a dead one.
592. Laurence H. Tribe, Revisiting the Rule of Law, 64. N.Y.U. L. REV. 726, 727
(1989).
593. Cf Laurence H. Tribe, Revisiting the Rule of Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 726
(1989) and Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
1175 (1989).
594. Tribe, supra note 592, at 728.
595. See id. at 729-30.
596. Id. at 729.
597. Id. at 730.
598. Id. at 729.
599. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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In Brown, Tribe argues, the. Supreme Court recognized the
"compassionate and simple principle that black Americans should
not be treated differently than whites, because doing so put blacks
6
in a position of inferiority that was "hurtful to human beings." 11
Tribe argues that just as the Court and the American people came
to recognize that segregation was a denial of equal protection,
these same notions of decency and compassion can and should be
incorporated into the Rule of Law. 6° '
Having waved what Scalia has called "the bloody shirt of
Brown ,"602 Tribe nonetheless fails to accurately interpret Scalia's
view of the Rule of Law. Scalia does not assert that the law itself
is without compassion or vision, he asserts that the personal opinions of judges-whether they are compassionate or heartlesshave no place in a system of jurisprudence that is founded upon
the Rule of Law. Scalia would agree that Brown was rightly
decided, but it was rightly decided not because of society's notions
of decency and compassion, but because the text of the Equal Protection Clause required that result.60 3
Ultimately, Tribe mischaracterizes Scalia's Rule of Law as a
threat, rather than a protection. If the Rule of Law is to remain a
"vital baseline," only clear legal rules and clear principles that will
provide that protection, not a romantic ideal of beneficent rules.
More importantly, if judges are to be restrained from deciding
cases based on their personal beliefs and biases, again only clear
rules and clear principles will afford that protection, not judges'
"common knowledge about the facts of life."60 4 In the end, it is the
Rule of Law and not vague notions of a Rule of Love that will provide for a Law of Rules.

600. Tribe, supra note 592, at 730.
601. See id. at 731.
602. In remarks made to student body at the University of Kansas School of
Law on October 3, 1996, Justice Scalia, in response to a question, said that his
critics often "wave the bloody shirt of Brown" to demonstrate the weaknesses in
his theory of constitutional interpretation. Scalia went on to say that he agreed

with the decision in Brown not because of the "rightness" of that decision, but
because the text of the Equal Protection Clause would allow no other result.

603. Id.
604. Id. at 760.
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2. On Footnotes, Individual Rights & the Constitution
Professor Tribe also has criticized Justice Scalia's method of
constitutional interpretation. 0 5 He admits, however, that he has
no theory of his own.6 0 6 Further, Tribe states that he doubts that
"any defensible set of 'rules'" for interpreting the constitution
exists.6 07 Although Tribe states that there is no "how to" manual
on constitutional interpretation, he asserts that there is a how not
to manual.60 8
According to Tribe, the way not to interpret the Constitution
is by using its text as the sole or ultimate point of reference.60 9
While the text has "primacy," Tribe argues that there is nothing in
the text itself that tells us how its meaning is to be ascertained. 1 0
Except, of course, for the Ninth Amendment. 61 1 This Amendment,
according to Tribe, allows for the recognition of rights not found in
the text of the Constitution. 12 When the Fourteenth Amendment
fails, when the Fourth Amendment fails, or when Supreme Court
justices fail to recognize a right, the Ninth Amendment is there to
protect us all.61 3
Tribe also criticizes Scalia for failing to follow his own rules of
constitutional interpretation. Pointing out that Scalia has upheld
free speech rights where a "conservative" would not have done so,
Tribe concludes that Scalia is guided by "a set of principles whose
understanding may evolve over time, reflecting.., some of the
aspirations of the former colonists about what sorts of rights they
605. See Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CH. L. REv. 1057 (1990). In this article, Tribe and
Doff challenge Scalia's method of constitutional interpretation. In particular,
they challenge Scalia's preference for examining whether a right is fundamental
or not by examining "'the most specific level at which a relevant tradition

protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be defined.'" Id. at
1058 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2334 n.6 (1989)).
606. SCALA, supra note 397, at 73. In this book, Justice Scalia writes an
introductory essay and several scholars - legal and otherwise - respond to
what he has written. In his response, Professor Tribe focused primarily on
Scalia's theory of constitutional interpretation.
607. See id.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 77.
610. Id. at 77-78.
611. Id. at 78. The text of the Ninth Amendment states that "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX
612. See ScAA, supra note 397, at 78.
613. See id.
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*..
would enjoy."6 14 Tribe argues that Scalia's reading of the First
Amendment's freedom of speech to encompass flag burning or
cross burning "entail[s] a most ambitious exercise in attributing
modern ideas of the free speech principle to our predecessors."6 1 5
Additionally, Tribe asserts that Scalia, through his willingness to apply the doctrine of stare decisis, "implicitly accepts some
notion of evolving constitutional principles," 1 6 Tribe argues that
because Scalia is willing to apply precedent when deciding cases,
he implicitly accepts the notion of a "transtemporal" Constitution.61 7 That is, Scalia is willing to accept the idea of a living Constitution. This being true, Tribe nonetheless agrees that some
constitutional provisions do not invite broad interpretation.6 1 8
Further, he agrees that some provisions should be "understood as
putting in place a quite definite architecture. . . through which
power is to be exercised, rather than proclaiming open-ended principles of any kind."6 1 9 He argues, however, that "not all constitutional provisions are of this sort," and that it is in this belief that
he and Justice Scalia will continue to differ.6 2 °
Finally, Tribe argues that Scalia's theory of constitutional
interpretation will "achieve neutrality by all but abdicating judicial responsibility to protect individual rights."6 2 ' In particular,
Tribe criticizes Scalia's belief that in determining fundamental
rights, the Court must "refer to the most specific level at which a
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified." 62 2 Tribe points out that "the law
has never given its blessing to behavior simply because it is 'traditional.'" 62 3 In fact, he argues, "legally cognizable 'traditions'
...mirror majoritarian, middle-class conventions."6 2 4 Tribe not
only criticizes this method of interpretation, but also its application. He argues that "historical traditions are susceptible to even
greater manipulation than are legal precedents."6 2 5 Additionally,
614. Id. at 81.

615. Id. at 82.
616. Id.
617. See id.

618. Id.
619. Id. at 93 (Emphasis in the original).
620. Id. at 94 (Emphasis in the original).

621. Tribe & Dori supra note 605, at 1086.
622. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 n.6 (1989).
623. See Tribe & Dort supra note 605, at 1087.

624. Id.
625. Id.
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Tribe argues that deciding what is the "most specific level at
which a relevant tradition exists," is like asking whether "a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." 626 Further,
Tribe argues that because Scalia does not tell courts how to measure the specificity of traditions, "he cannot escape the valueladen choice of a level, and a direction, of abstraction. "627
In Michael H. for example, Tribe argues that the most specific
level of tradition would not be "what are the rights of the natural
father of a child adulterously conceived," as asserted by Scalia.6 2 8
Instead, the most specific level of tradition would be "what are the
rights of the natural father of a child conceived in an adulterous
but long-standing relationship where the father has played a
major, if sporadic, role in the child's life."629 In part because the
most specific level of tradition is not addressed, Tribe argues that
"Justice Scalia is aware that this method ...

would severely cur-

individual liberties.
tail the Supreme Court's role in protecting
63 0
Indeed, that seems to be his purpose."

Combining this method with Scalia's statement that "looking
at [an] act which is assertedly the subject of a liberty interest in
isolation from its effect on other people [is] rather like inquiring
whether there is a liberty interest in firing a gun where the case at
hand happens to involve its discharge into another person's
body,"6 3 1 Tribe warns that faithfully carried out, Scalia's method
"could eliminate the use of the Due Process Clauses as guarantors
of any fundamental liberties."6 32 Moreover, he argues that this
method would have courts start their search from" a very specific
liberty indeed-one that has the state interest built into it from
the start."6 33 Additionally, Tribe argues that while in a "perfect
world" elected legislatures would protect individual rights, "[1]ike
it or not, judges must squarely face the task of deciding how.., to
define our liberties."634

626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.

Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1092.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 605, at 1092.
Id. at 1093.
Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2342 n.4.
See Tribe & Doff, supra note 605, at 1096.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1099.
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3. Scalia Responds
In his recently published book, A Matter of Interpretation,635
Scalia had the opportunity to respond directly to many of Tribe's
criticisms. While Scalia appreciated Tribe's humility and candor
in admitting that he has no constitutional theory of his own, he
stated that such characteristics "would assuredly carry the day if
the issue before us were quality of character ...[b]ut they are of
little use to the judge who must determine whether and wither the
Constitution has wandered, and who is not permitted to render a
636
candid and humble judgment of 'Undecided.'"
Responding to Tribe's criticism that some provisions of the
Constitution should be read strictly from the text while others,
like the Fourteenth Amendment, "reflect the aspirations of the
former colonists about what sorts of rights they... would come to
enjoy,"637 Scalia stated that:
I do not believe that. If you want aspirations, you can read the
Declaration of Independence, with its pronouncements that 'all
men are created equal' with 'unalienable rights' that include 'Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.'... There is no such philosophizing in our Constitution, which unlike the Declaration of
Independence . . . is a practical and- pragmatic charter of

government.63 s
Additionally, Scalia stated that if Professor Tribe is correct
that the Bill of Rights is aspirational, then it is the legislatureand
not the courts who should be the Constitution's ultimate interpreter.63 9 Moreover, Scalia argued, the underlying holding of
Marbury v. Madison64 0-that "[iut is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" 6 4 1

-

wrong.642

would be
Marbury is not wrong, however, Scalia concludes, and judges are naturally appropriate expositors of the
law.643 They are not, on the other hand, "naturally appropriate
635. See ScALLA, supra note 397, at 133-43.
636. Id. at 137.
637. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).

638. Id. at 134.
639. Id.
640. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

641. Id. at 177.
642. See ScALA, supra note 397, at 136.
643. Id.
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expositors of the aspirations of a particular age; that task is better
done by [the] legislature .. .
Next, Scalia responds to Tribe's contention that because of his
First Amendment jurisprudence he is at heart an aspirationist:
[Aill three examples [Tribe] selects involve the First Amendment,
for which the Court has developed long-standing and well
accepted principles... that are effectively irreversible. That my
opinions sought to apply those principles faithfully does not prove
•.. that I am unfaithful to my interpretive philosophy. Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation put into practice in an
ongoing system of law, must accommodate the doctrine of stare
decisis; it cannot remake the world anew.6 4 5
Similarly, Scalia argues that his use of stare decisis does not,
as Tribe suggests, leave him "open to the charge of importing [his]
64 6
own views and values into the law."
Acceptance of the doctrine of stare decisis is not, Scalia
argues, unique to originalists or textualists. 6 4 7 "The demand that
originalists alone 'be true to their lights' and forswear stare decisis
is essentially a demand that they alone render their methodology
so disruptive of the established state of things that it will be useful only as an academic exercise and not as a workable proscription for judicial governance."6 ' s Scalia does not deny, however,
that the application of the doctrine may result in some arbitrariness. Instead, he constrains his own use of the doctrine by applying consistent rules.6 4 9 Additionally, Scalia responds to Tribe's
criticism that whatever those rules might be, they are not found in
the original meaning of the text by saying that "staredecisis is
not a part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception
to it."

6 50

Finally, Scalia responds to Tribe's idea that the text of the
Constitution can be read in a transtemporal manner. While
agreeing that the Constitution can be read in a different manner
over time, Scalia argues that reading it in a different way "does
not require reading it in such a fashion that its meaning
changes."651
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.

Id.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 139.
Id.

649. Id. at 140.

650. Id.
651. Id.
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4. On Advocating for a Dead Constitution
Tribe's idea of a "transtemporal" constitution is simply a synonym for an evolving constitution. An evolving constitution is the
antithesis of a constitution comprised of clear rules, clear lines,
and clear principles. When Scalia advocates, tongue in cheek, for
a "dead" constitution, he does not advocate for a constitution that
cannot withstand the changes of time, nor for one that fails to protect the citizens of this country. Indeed, his desire for clear rules
and for structural rigor advocate just that: individual rights. By
beginning with the text and insisting on structural safeguards,
Scalia ensures that all people will be treated in the same manner.
Whether you are a Catholic drinking alcohol at mass, or a
Native American smoking peyote in a religious ceremony, all generally applicable criminal laws apply to you. And, whether you
are an independent counsel appointed by judges, or a sentencing
commission comprised of judges, the text of the Constitution dictates the limits of your powers. And, whether you are a citizen
seeking the passage of a bill, or the head of the House Judiciary
Committee seeking the same, the text of that bill must be clear.
An evolving constitution may travel through the vagaries of time,
but a dead constitution-in all of its stillness-affords protection
not just for the moment, and not for one person, but for all time
and for all people.
B.

ChristopherSmith's Labels and Tables

Another of Scalia's critics has created a virtual cottage industry for himself by criticizing Scalia. Professor Christopher Smith
has published eight articles and two books on Scalia in just seven
years.65 2 Of all Scalia's critics, however, Smith appears to be the
652. The following are articles and books which either in whole, or in part,
address Smith's criticisms of Scalia: Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court's
Emerging Majority: Restraining the High Court or Transforming Its Role? 24

AKRON L. REV. 393 (1990); Christopher E. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and the
Institutions of American Government, 25 WAKE FORREST L. REV. 783 (1991);
Christopher E. Smith & Linda Fry, Vigilance orAccommodation? The Changing
Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 893 (1991);
Christopher E. Smith & Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rhenquist Court'sActivism
and the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REv. 52 (1993); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT

(1993); Christopher E. Smith & Kimberly A. Beuger, Cloud's in a Crystal Ball:
Presidential Expectations and the Unpredictable Behavior of Supreme Court
Appointees, 27 AKRON L. REV. 115 (1993); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R.
Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court Packing Efforts of Presidents
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least willing to look critically and objectively at his jurisprudence.
Smith's articles and books consistently direct the same criticisms
at Scalia. His articles often contain statistics concerning the
Court's record as a whole, and Scalia's "record" in particular.
These statistics purport to demonstrate the Court's move to the
right. While this may be true, Smith's superficial analysis, and
simplistic use of labels--"conservative" or "liberal"-add little to
the debate about Scalia's jurisprudence.
1.

Scalia, JudicialRestraint, & PoliticalMinorities

Smith has correctly stated that Justice Scalia is one of the
most vocal advocates of judicial restraint.6 5 3 While accepting the
premise that judicial restraint is necessary, Smith nonetheless
asserts that Scalia's restraint hides a majoritarian bias.6 5 4 In contrast to Professor Tribe, Smith argues that Scalia is more than
willing to overturn precedent with which he disagrees. 6 5 5 For
example, when Scalia said that "I would think it a violation of my
oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly unjustified intrusion
upon the democratic process in order that the Court might save
face,"6S6 Smith interpreted this to mean that Scalia is "concerned
about advancing his own interpretations of the Constitution
regardless of contrary case precedents."6 5 7
Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REV. 111 (1994); Christopher E. Smith, The
Constitutionand CriminalPunishment: The Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia
and Thomas, 43 Drake L. Rev. 593 (1995); Christopher E. Smith, The Impact of
New Justices: The United States Supreme Court and CriminalJustice Policy, 30
AKRON L. REV. 55 (1996); DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA (1996). It is interesting to
note, however, that while the articles and books are numerous, the criticism and the support for that criticism - stay much the same. Professor Smith's first
article about Scalia, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Institutions of American
Government, is a virtual blueprint for his subsequent books. While Smith
includes additional cases and some additional material in the books, the books
are largely a restatement of the article. His subsequent articles, while about the
Rehnquist Court as a whole, focus primarily on Scalia, reiterating many of the
same criticisms found in his books.
653. Christopher Smith, The Supreme Court'sEmerging Majority: Restraining
the High Court or Transforming Its Role?, 24 AKRON L. REV. 393, 399 (1990).
654. See id. at 409-21.
655. Id. at 406.
656. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,825 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), overruled, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
657. See Smith, supra note 653, at 406.
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Additionally, Smith has criticized Scalia's belief that the
Court should remove itself from politics.

658

Smith asserts that the

public has little awareness of the Court or its functions and that if
Scalia were "truly concerned about preserving the Supreme
Court's image as a legal rather than a political institution, [he
would] show more concern about maintaining the stability of the
law

....

"659

Further, Smith argues that Scalia is insensitive to political
minorities. 660 Smith cites Employment Division v. Smith 66 1 as an

example of this insensitivity. Smith states that all religions are
not created equal, and that because "Native Americans have little
power in Congress... [the defendants] turned... to the Supreme
Court, the one institution of government structured to protect
individuals' constitutional rights from destruction by majoritarian
policy initiatives."66 2
Smith also argues that Scalia's deference to the legislative
and executive branches of government "significantly narrow the
scope of individuals' free exercise rights."66 3 Such deference,
according to Smith, "creates risks that the 'tyranny of the majority' will infringe upon the religious freedom of political minorities
who lack clout in the legislative and executive branches of government."66 4 Smith asserts that allowing Native Americans to use

peyote in their religious ceremonies is no different than allowing
Christians to use alcohol in their ceremonies.665
Smith concludes that, if the Supreme Court will not safeguard
the rights of religious minorities, no one will.6 66 He argues that

although women and racial minorities have "increasingly succeeded in gaining political power through the electoral process...
and are now better able to protect their interests in the executive
and legislative branches ...

[r]eligious minorities tend to be too

658. Id. at 408.
659. Id. at 409.
660. Id. at 411-12.
661. 494 U.S. 872 (1993).
662. See Smith, supra note 653, at 413 (emphasis added).
663. Christopher Smith & Linda Fry, Vigilance or Accommodation: The
ChangingSupreme Court and Religious Freedom, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 893, 925

(1991).
664. Id. at 937.
665. See id. at n. 233.
666. Id. at 941.
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small to organize effectively in order to gain political power
through the electoral process. "667
Another example of Scalia's insensitivity, Smith argues, is his
treatment of criminal defendants. 668 According to Smith, the
Court's unwillingness to recognize criminal defendants as a political minority leads to their victimization by the elected branches
of government.6 6 9 In particular, Smith argues, Scalia's judicial
philosophy "undercut[s] the courts' constitutional mandate to
serve as a check on political branches protecting the rights of
minorities .... 670 Smith warns that this insensitivity will lead to
the abdication of the Supreme Court's role as guardian of the
rights of political minorities.6 7 1
Finally, in his "labels and tables" articles, Smith casts Scalia
as an inflexible conservative who consistently votes his political
ideologies. 6 72 Beginning in 1991, Smith has devoted much time
and space to gathering statistics about how the justices, and
Scalia in particular, vote.6 7 3 Smith labels Scalia a "conservative,"
and then with little or no analysis, places most of his opinions in
that same category.6 7 4
2.

On Analysis, Objectivity, and Clear Vision

Although Professor Smith has written prolifically about
Scalia, it appears that he has failed to read and digest Justice
Scalia's writings. If he had given thoughtful consideration to
667. Id. at 942.
668. See Smith, supra note 653, at 414.
669. See id. at 415.
670. Id.
671. Id. at 420.
672. See Christopher E. Smith & Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court's
Activism and the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REV. 52 (1993); CHRISTOPHER E.
SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME CoUtRs CONSERVATIVE
MOVEMENT (1993); Christopher E. Smith & Kimberly A. Beuger, Cloud's in a

Crystal Ball: Presidential Expectations and the Unpredictable Behavior of
Supreme Court Appointees, 27 AKRON L. REV. 115 (1993); Christopher E. Smith
& Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court Packing Efforts of
PresidentsReagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REV. 111 (1994); Christopher E. Smith,
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Scalia's opinions as a whole, rather than simply dividing them
into neat categories and labeling them, perhaps Smith would not
be so quick and sure in his judgments about Scalia. It is Scalia's
point precisely that the Supreme Court is not the primary institution of government that protects individual liberties, rather Congress is. When Scalia says that it would be a violation of his oath
to adhere to decisions which intrude upon the democratic process,
that statement is consistent with his belief that judges should be
restrained. It does not mean, and has never meant, that Scalia
would advance his own theory of constitutional interpretation
without regard for precedent.
Similarly, Smith criticizes Scalia's "deference" to the legislative and executive branch. This "deference" is not, however,
another one of Scalia's theories used to advance his own ideologies. It is a "theory" born from the text of the Constitution. It is
ironic that Smith believes that such deference will lead to a tyranny of the majority, for separation-of-powers prevents exactly
that. Without the structure inherent in this doctrine, there would
be no clear division of power. Scalia defers to this structure not
because he seeks to advance his own causes, but because no judge
should be allowed to advance his own cause. As a judge, Scalia
protects this framework not for his own sake, but for the sake of
us all. It would be much more logical for Justice Scalia to advance
a personal agenda by claiming for the Court itself as much governmental power as possible.
Smith himself unwittingly gives the best example of why
Scalia is "insensitive" to political minorities. He says that women
and racial minorities have succeeded in gaining political power
through the electoral process, power which has enabled them to
protect their interests at all levels of government. 675 He goes on to

say that religious minorities, such as the defendants in Smith, are
too small as a group to gain such power effectively. 676 Smith has
aptly-if inadvertently-described "a trend in government that
has developed in recent centuries, called democracy." 677 It is precisely this system of government which allows political minorities
to organize and gain political power. Scalia himself admits, however, that this same system of government will leave at a relative
disadvantage those political minorities that are not well organized, or those who have not gained power. Still, this democratic
675. See Smith, supra note 663, at 942.
676. Id.
677. See ScALLA, supra note 397, at 9.
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system of government should be preferred to "a system in which
each conscience is a law unto itself .... 6 7 s
In the end, Smith fails to soar because he looks primarily at
the result of Scalia's decisions, rather than at the principles and
the methodology underlying those decisions. Smith labels Scalia a
conservative and labels his opinions as wrong, but he fails to analyze critically Scalia's jurisprudence. It is, after all, far simpler to
label Scalia than it is to engage him.
V.

CONCLUSION

While Professor Tribe may be the most prominent of Scalia's
critics, and Professor Smith the most prolific, they are by no
means alone or even in the minority. Scholars, students, and journalists all form a line, anxiously awaiting their turn to criticize
the Justice. The American people, with little to inform them other
than newspaper accounts of Scalia, often join this band of critics.
Nonetheless, it is to the people, the lawyers, and the law schools
that the significance and implications of Scalia's jurisprudence
must be explained. Justice Scalia, with his usual wit, explained
the dilemma well when he said:
The American people have been converted to the belief in the Living Constitution, a 'morphing' document that means, from age to
age, what it ought to mean ....

This, of course, is the end of the

Bill of Rights, whose meaning will be committed to the very body
it was meant to protect against: the majority. By trying to make
the Constitution do everything that needs doing
from age to age,
6 79
we shall have caused it to do nothing at all.
In the end, Justice Scalia's preferred principles-the Rule of
Law, strict separation-of-powers, and textual statutory interpretation-are inextricably bound together by his preference for clear
rules, clear lines, and clear text. Ultimately, Scalia soars because
he has a strong vision of our constitutional system of government,
he is unwilling to compromise on his bedrock principles, and he
articulates his principles with a wit and style that few can match.
Justice Scalia waits still for his critics to propose and explicate
legitimate, workable alternatives to his principles. Thus, the
challenge is clear for those who would join the debate with Justice
Scalia. If not his favored principles, then which ones?

678. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
679. See SCALLA, supra note 397, at 47.
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